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ABSTRACT

Cybercrime and Facebook: An Examination of Lifestyle-Routine Activity Theory
(December 2016)

Master of Science in Criminal Justice, Texas A&M International University, 2016;
Chair of Committee: Dr. Claudia San Miguel
The purpose of this study is to determine if Facebook® utilization impacts online
victimization experience, and if prevention measures moderate such impact. This study
primarily focuses on Facebook® users due to this social media outlet being considered the
most prominent online networking site today (Milanovic, 2015). It will focus on an
understudied population—Hispanic college students. Additionally, this study argues that
lifestyle-routine activity theory is appropriate in the attempt of explaining cybercrime.
Overall, this study will explain and define: online victimization, types of cybercrimes,
prevention measures, Facebook® utilization, Hispanic and college student statistics, and
studies on the application of lifestyle-routine activity theory in the explanation of cybercrime
victimization.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In our modern society, the use of social media is rapidly taking the place of regular
person-to-person communication (Keller, 2013). The burgeoning use of social media has
created distinct implications for the criminal justice system, such as the corruption of
evidence by the general public, and ensuring the right to a fair trial (Milivojevic &
McGovern, 2014). Although various leading and contemporary criminological theories can
be used to explain crime, the habitual use of social media has led to new forms of criminal
activity and victimization (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2014) which do not fit nearly
into traditional criminological theory. Therefore, in order to cope with the new domain of
cybercrime, traditional theories may require broadening or re-envisioning. As the Internet has
become an important facet of everyday life, particularly for social interactions and means of
communication, many individuals have fallen victims to cybercrime on social media sites
(Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2014; Reyns, Henson, & Fisher, 2011). Peer-to-peer
networks, such as Facebook®, Twitter, and Instagram, are examples of social media sites and
are often abused by online motivated offenders who engage in a variety of cybercrimes
(Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2014). In 2014 alone, the Federal Bureau of Investigations
(hereafter FBI) concluded that 9,833 individuals were victims of cybercrimes on social media
outlets.
Victimization is defined as a person is suffering or has experienced physical,
emotional, mental, or financial harm committed by another. Victimization is often related to
actions or inactions taken by users of social media sites. Most often, inactions are associated
____________
This thesis follows the style of Adult Education Quarterly.
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with privacy or security settings and/or the oversharing of information which create prime
opportunities for motivated offenders. For instance, Facebook®, which is the most commonly
used social media site with a worldwide average of 1.01 billion active users a day
(Milanovic, 2015), offers users two privacy/security options. Users may either set their
profiles to public or private; a public profile means that others can view all of the information
posted on the user’s profile (Henson, Reyns, & Fisher, 2011). Users who want a more private
profile may pick and choose the information they would like to share with people who are
considered to be their “friends” on the networking site (Henson et al., 2011). Furthermore,
the security feature known as “user control”, affords users the ability to accept or decline a
friend request(s) to be associated with another user’s profile page (Henson et al., 2011). The
precautions and/or prevention measures, or a distinct lack thereof, in an online environment
may create ample opportunities for cybercriminals. In essence, an individual’s cyber lifestyle
and online routines may increase the likelihood of victimization.
Research on victimization in cyberspace is still in its infancy, and the majority of
available studies have been: (1) exploratory in nature, (2) focused on adolescent samples, and
(3) generally limited to analyzing the sole cybercrime of—bullying due to its prevalence in
cyberspace (Gilkerson, 2012). Additionally, little empirical attention has been devoted to the
correlation between a user’s Facebook® utilization (i.e., victimization prevention measures)
and victimization (Henson et al., 2011). A user’s privacy/security settings are critical factors
to analyze since they may create opportunities for motivated offenders. More importantly,
this study will advance research by focusing on an understudied population—Hispanic
college students. Although there are a number of studies on Hispanic victimization that are
unrelated to cyber activity (see FBI, 2014; Sugarmann, 2014; FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,
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2015), little is known about the prevalence of cybercrimes committed on Hispanic college
students. Therefore, this research serves to address this gap in the literature on victimization
of Hispanics.
While cyber victimization can occur on any social media site such as Twitter and
Instagram, this study will focus its attention on Facebook® because it is the most commonly
used social media site worldwide (Milanovic, 2015). The core hypothesis of this study is that
Facebook® utilization (measured as online activity and/or number of hours spent online) will
impact online victimization but, such experience will be moderated by the type of prevention
measure used (e.g., the number of mutual friends and the recognition of friend requests, and
the degree of user control pertaining to what type of information they allow to be public or
private). Thus, victimization experience will be the dependent variable and Facebook®
utilization, personal characteristics, and prevention measures will be independent variables.
This study will then be able to determine if personal characteristics, prevention measures,
and Facebook® utilization are significant in determining victimization experience.
This study will further advance the application of a theoretical framework by
analyzing two theories—routine activity theory and lifestyle theory. When considering
criminological theoretical perspectives, Cohen and Felson’s routine activity theory (1979)
has been used in an attempt to explain cybercrime (Reyns et al., 2011). Routine activity
theory accounts for how opportunities of criminal victimization are produced or increased by
analyzing and examining an individual’s behavior and routines of everyday life (Reyns et al.,
2011). Additionally, even though space and time are requirements for criminal victimization
to occur in a physical environment, when considering routine activity theory, such elements
may not be applicable to online victimization (Reyns et al., 2011). According to Reyns et al.
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(2011), the latter elements of the theory may not apply because individuals do not physically
come into contact with the offender. However, in an online setting, space and time may arise
as factors, when the potential victim and the offender connect in some form using an Internet
connection (Reyns et al., 2011). For instance, an offender and a victim can be roaming a chat
room, the same shopping website, or on the same social media site (Gordon & Ford, 2006).
Therefore, there may be convincing arguments for the application of routine activity theory
to the explanation of victimization in an online environment (Reyns et al., 2011) and this
study will explore such applications.
Lifestyle theory, is considered to be a personal victimization theory first developed by
Michael Hindelang, Michael Gottfredson, and James Garafalo in 1979 (Jenson &
Brownfield, 1986). Lifestyle theory first posits that an individual’s patterns and daily
activities play a major role in the likelihood of increasing or decreasing chances of
victimization (Myrstol & Chermak, 2005). Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garafalo (as cited in
Jenson & Brownfield, 1986) indicate that the degree, extent, and/or severity of victimization
depends on their exposure to motivated offenders and guardianship in accordance to their
lifestyle(s). Because routine activity theory and lifestyle theory are intertwined in the
explanation of how victimization occurs as a result of an individual’s routines or lifestyles,
both theories will be combined into lifestyle-routine activity theory which we will refer to as
LRAT for the purpose of this study. Combining these theories has been reported in previous
research of cybercrime and online victimization (see Holt & Bossler, 2009; Reyns, Henson,
& Fisher, 2011; Yar, 2005; Taylor et al., 2006; Choi, 2008; Bossler & Holt, 2009; Ngo &
Patermaster, 2011).
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Summary
In sum, this study aims to provide an overall understanding of cybercrimes,
specifically in relation to: (1) types of cybercrimes committed against college students, (2)
different precautions or actions taken by students in a cyber-environment, and (3) the user’s
adoption of security settings on social networking sites in pertinence to the number of mutual
friends, recognition of the individuals who send friend requests, and the degree of user
control. Most importantly, this study will explore these factors with a Hispanic student
population—an understudied population in relation to cyber victimization.
This research study is important to the criminal justice system because it
acknowledges the prevalence of cybercrimes occurring on social networking sites. The study
will explore the pervasiveness of crimes occurring online as the result of lifestyle choices and
routines taken in cyberspace. The study will also identify types of cybercrimes being
committed amongst the Hispanic college student population. Moreover, this study advances
research in the criminal justice field by providing an overall understanding of cybercrimes,
analyzing how prevention measures differ in an online environment, and by adopting an
analytical approach where LRAT is incorporated in explaining cybercrime victimization.
Additionally, when referring to cybercrime victimization throughout this proposal, such term
will be used to define the different types of cybercrimes that will be studied (e.g. hacking,
online-romance scams/catfish, cyber-impersonation, online/internet fraud, and identity theft).
The reason for this clarification is due to a majority of literature focusing on the form of
cyberbullying victimization and online victimization is broader than pure cyberbullying
victimization.
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The following chapters of this thesis will discuss and analyze cybercrime and online
victimization on social networking sites, particularly on Facebook®. Additionally, the
sections will present and discuss the issue of risk pre-cautions individuals may take in a
physical and online environment in regards to privacy/security settings. The study sections
and subsections will: define social networking sites, cybercrimes, online
victimization/cybercrime victimization, types of cybercrime (cyberbullying/harassment,
hacking/cyber warfare, online romance scams/catfish, cyber impersonation, online/internet
fraud, and identity theft), Facebook® utilization (online activity), prevention measures (i.e.,
number of mutual friends, the recognition of friend requests, and the degree of user control),
Hispanic victimization statistics, college students victimization statistics, and lifestyle-routine
activity theory applied to cybercrime victimization. Finally, the theoretical framework will be
discussed followed by the methodology section which includes the study location, target
population, sampling technique and sample information, the instrument used, the conduct of
study, hypothesis, measurements (dependent and independent variables), and limitations of
the research study.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Internet has provided people all over the world with an infinite number of
opportunities, including criminal opportunities (Reyns et al., 2011). Not only does the
Internet allow individuals to interact with others, communicate with family and friends,
develop new personal relationships and build professional networks, but it also gives an
individual the chance of not having to leave his/her home nor having to meet others in the
physical world (Bossler & Holt, 2009). The Internet has altered how individuals
communicate and interact with others so much so that it has modified routines and lifestyles
(Bossler & Holt, 2009; Bossler et al., 2012). As of 2013, Internet usage has grown to having
approximately 657 million users worldwide (Marcum, Higgins, Freiburger, & Ricketts,
2013). While the Internet has created many beneficial impacts to daily interactions, it has
also increased opportunities for crime (Marcum et al., 2013). Undoubtedly, the Internet has
created new prospects for criminal activities (cybercrimes) such as cyberbullying, identity
theft, and cyber impersonation which will be discussed in a subsequent section. The
prospects can occur in cyber-venues or social networking sites such as Twitter, Instagram,
and Facebook® (Reyns et al., 2012).
Social Networking Sites and Privacy/Security Settings
As of April 2015, the top three social networking sites listed as the world’s most
important were: Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook® (Milanovic, 2015). Twitter is considered
to be one of the simplest and easiest social media platforms to learn and use (Milanovic,
2015). Users can send messages but they are limited to only 140 words. Setting up an
account is fast and easy (Milanovic, 2015). Instagram, on the other hand, simply allows an

8
individual to take a picture, choose a filter of their liking, add comments, and share photos
with those who are following them if their account is private or allows everyone to view their
photos if the account settings are set to public (Instagram, 2013; Milanovic, 2015).
Facebook® allows individuals to become connected online (called “friends” in Facebook®
terminology) with colleagues, relatives, and even strangers (Milanovic, 2015). Facebook®
focuses on sharing pictures, thoughts, links, and the opportunity of supporting and liking
pages of organizations and brands (Milanovic, 2015). Of the three, Facebook® has the most
users—an average of 1.01 billion active users a day (Milanovic, 2015).
When discussing the topic of online victimization on social networking sites, privacy
settings are of great importance due to the amount of personal data shared in the world of
social media (Liu, Gummadi, Krishnamurthy, & Mislove, 2011). Oftentimes, users believe
their information is private when in reality desired settings are rarely present (Liu et al.,
2011). Users desired settings are continuously more open to exposing content such as their
phone numbers, addresses, pictures of their family members, the cars they drive, how much
money they make, drug usage, and other supplementary personal information (Barnes, 2006).
Most users do not understand or are not aware of the dangers that may occur due to revealing
personal information on social networking sites (Barnes, 2006). As a result, if an individual
is not cognizant of his/her privacy settings, they may become a victim of a cybercrime. To
avoid becoming an online victim from any form of cybercrime, the National Cyber Security
Alliance (2015) suggests that users learn and review the privacy and security settings that
exists for the social networking site they associate with. The organization states individuals
should be cautious as to how much personal information they are providing criminals with
and to be aware of what individuals they are adding on their profiles. Additionally, every

9
online social networking site provides a security or privacy setting to where the user may
change the settings to what best makes them comfortable (Trend Micro, 2015).
Facebook®, for example, offers users two options: basic privacy settings or advanced
privacy control settings (Facebook Help Center, 2015). Basic privacy settings allows a user
to select who can view his/her information, how he/she can connect with friends, who can
add him/her, who can see his/her profile, and remove posts he/she does not want to be
linked/tagged to his/her profile page (Facebook Help Center, 2015). Alternatively, the
advanced privacy controls allow users to remove posts he/she was tagged in, approve tags
before allowing his/her friends to view the post(s), stop a user from posting on their timeline,
make finding him/her more difficult, and allow certain posts to be hidden from others
(Facebook Help Center, 2015). With Instagram, this social networking site allows its users to
block a person, delete or report comments, make their posts private or public, and report a
post (Instagram, 2013). The Instagram community is dedicated to using powerful tools that
will help users obtain a supportive, safe, and private account (Instagram, 2013). On the other
hand, when an Internet user creates a Twitter account, that user’s profile is automatically
public (Twitter Help Center, 2015). The user will then have the option of setting his/her
Twitter account to private to protect his/her Tweets (Twitter Help Center, 2015). On a
positive note, Tweets that had been public once a user decides to set his/her account to
private, will no longer be available to the public when they search for his/her account; only
approved Twitter followers will have access to a user’s Tweets (Twitter Help Center, 2015).
As can be surmised, most cybercrimes are association with privacy/security settings on social
media sites.
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This study will solely focus on one social networking site— Facebook®, due to the
enormous amount of daily users. On average, there are over 1.5 billion active users a month
plus Facebook® has one of the most featured-rich and widely-used platforms (Smith, 2016).
Additionally, Facebook® is constantly evolving to allow users more flexibility to add photos,
friends, videos, applications, games, and to review their security and privacy settings online
(Facebook Product/Service, 2012). Overall, the focus on Facebook® in this study is due to its
history, popularity, and growth compared to other top social networking sites mentioned
above.
Cybercrimes
A cybercrime is defined by Halder and Jaishankar (2011) as an offense committed
against an individual or a group of individuals through the use of technology such as the
Internet, emails, and chat rooms with the criminal intent of purposefully causing physical,
mental, or emotional harm as cited in Oluga, Ahmad, Alnagrat, Oluwatosin, Sawad, and
Muktar (2014). The use of computer-based technologies is the principal means of committing
an offense through cyberspace (Kshetri, 2013; Oluga et al., 2014). Various kinds of
cybercrimes exist such as cyberbullying, cyber extortion, hacking, copyright infringement,
online romance scams, identity theft, online fraud. (Oluga et al., 2014). Additionally, it is
important to note that cybercrimes may occur in a variety of facets or scenarios such as
online shopping websites, emails, and social networking sites (Gordon & Ford, 2006).
Cybercrime has become a growing concern for public policy and has been examined
through the use of various criminological theories, individual factors, and situational factors
(Ngo & Paternoster, 2011). Furthermore, since the Internet does not solely provide Internet
connection for computers, it is important to consider other objects or devices that connect to
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the Internet which send or receive data such as cellular devices, as cyber threats (Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 2015). Palmiotto (2015) mentions that any electronic device or
object that has the capability of connecting to the Internet or that is able to receive or transmit
data should be categorized as a computer when discussing cybercrime.
The following subsections will focus on the cybercrimes this thesis will focus on.
Each type will be defined and outlined in further detail below:
Cyberbullying and harassment
Cyberbullying is defined as an individual or a group of individuals willfully using
electronic technology to repeatedly harass or threaten another individual by posting
disturbing photos, texts, or graphics or by sending such information to others (Dilmac, 2009).
Studies have shown that when considering online victimization in reference to traditional
bullying, there is no difference in an online setting (Brandl, 2014). Bullying victimization of
any kind may lead to poor academic performance, engagement in antisocial/deviant behavior,
and mental health consequences such as depression, depending on the severity of
cyberbullying taking place (Brandl, 2014). These consequences are exacerbated when
hundreds or thousands of people view or share such information with others thus contributing
to the emotional harm bullying causes (Brandl, 2014). At times, the information is
inaccurate or even false (Brandl, 2014). The following two cases illustrate the adverse
consequences of online victimization:
Jessica Logan was an 18 year old girl who graduated from Sycamore High School in
Ohio, Cincinnati in 2008 (Huffington Post, 2010). She was known as being artistic,
fun, and a vibrant individual (Cincinnati.com, 2009). Unfortunately, as a result of
being humiliated, frightened, harassed, bullied, and ridiculed in both an online and on
a face-to-face basis, she committed suicide a month after graduation (Huffington
Post, 2010). The taunting began after Jessica sent a nude photo of herself via cell
phone to her current boyfriend, when she was in high school. Shortly after, Jessica
and her boyfriend broke up and the ex-boyfriend sent the picture to other high school
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girls (NoBullying.com, 2015). The photo was then sent by the ex-boyfriend and
others to hundreds of teenagers from seven Cincinnati high schools (Cincinnati.com,
2009). She then was taunted not only in school but through social media networking
sites such as Facebook® and Myspace and via text messages (Cincinnati.com, 2009).
She was called names such as: whore, slut, and other vulgar terms (Cinncinati.com,
2009; NoBullying.com, 2015). Her mother presented her with the decision of being
home-schooled but Jessica wanted to finish school and speak about her story and
experience to make others aware about the danger of sending explicit photographs
through text messaging (Benotsch, Snipes, Martin, & Bull, 2013). Unfortunately,
Jessica later hung herself.
Tyler Clementi was an 18 year old college student at Rutgers University. Clementi
was a shy, sweet, and talented violinist (Foderaro, 2010). He had a passion for music
and played in the Rutgers Symphony Orchestra (Foderaro, 2010). Before leaving for
college, Clementi disclosed to his mom about being gay. Ridicule about being gay
began when his college roommate at the time, Dharun Ravi, secretly streamed a
sexual encounter he had with a man online (Tyler Clementi Foundation, 2014).
Clementi was not aware that he had been video recorded by his roommate until the
following day (Tyler Clementi Foundation, 2014). He became a topic of interest
online on the social networking site, Twitter (CBS News, 2015). Ravi continued to
post comments that may have caused Clementi emotional distress. He stated
comments such as: “I saw him making out with a dude. Yay; anyone with iChat, I
dare you to video chat me between the hours of 9:30 and 12. Yes, it’s happening
again” (Parker, 2012). Ravi did not act alone, as he was accompanied by a classmate,
Molly Wei (CBS News, 2015). As a result of the harassment, Clementi took his own
life on September 22, 2010 (Tyler Clementi Foundation, 2014). Shortly, before
committing suicide, Clementi posted on Facebook®: “Jumping off the G.W. Bridgesorry.” (CBS News, 2015). Dharun Ravi and Molly Wei were charged with several
crimes which included bias intimidation concerning hate crimes, and with invasion of
privacy under the peeping tom statute (CBS News, 2015). Wei agreed to a please and
avoided prosecution. Ravi was not charged with causing Tyler’s death but was
convicted on fifteen counts serving 20 days out of 30, in jail (CBS News, 2015).
Hacking/cyber warfare
While there are different kinds of hacking, this study focuses on computer hacking.
Computer hacking or intrusion has wide significance in the world of computer networking
and online communities (Jordan & Taylor, 1998). In addition, computer hacking is similar to
cyber warfare in which Dipert (2010) defines as an attack against a governmental or
civilians’ information system (Oluga et al., 2014). Warfare does not mean causing physical
damage, killing someone, or injuring anyone in anyway but rather that individuals may be
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affected by a cybercriminal taking confidential information from him/her that may benefit the
criminal (Oluga et al., 2014). Computer hacking or cyber warfare includes deceiving,
downloading, or intruding into a person’s communication and information systems (Oluga et
al., 2014). Hacking poses a great threat to those whose information has entered the
cyberspace world since then such information may get lost or into the possession of
cybercriminals. Below are two examples.
Sanford Wallace, a computer hacker who is known as the “Spam King” (Nichols,
2015). Wallace gained access into Facebook® accounts and hijacked those accounts to
send spam that was associated with phishing sites, and linked commercial websites
that pay spammers for referrals (Brodkin, 2010). Wallace allegedly obtained the login
credentials to the Facebook® accounts and Facebook® resulted fighting back against
Wallace through the legal system (Brodkin, 2010). He was charged with eleven
charges with ranged from fraud to damaging a protected computer for spreading more
than 30 million spam posts and messages on Facebook®. Wallace pleaded guilty and
agreed to a plea deal and is to serve no more than three years (Munson, 2015;
Nichols, 2015).
A second computer hacking story revolving around social networking sites would be
the case of Iranians hacking State Department officials Facebook® accounts in the
United States (Sanger & Perlroth, 2015). Even though it is noted that Iran’s cyber
skills are not as advanced as China’s and Russia’s they believe cyber espionage is a
tool they are beginning to use since the United States is less likely to respond to a
cyber-threat (Sanger & Perlroth, 2015). The Iranian hackers in this event hacked into
the Facebook® accounts and emails of individuals who are State Department officials
who focus on Iran and the Middle East (Sanger & Perlroth, 2015). By attaining access
to their accounts, they were able to search and find other members from the State
Department who focus on the geographical area of Iran (Sanger & Perlroth, 2015).
Thanks to Facebook® new alert system, they were able to notify the users that their
accounts had been hijacked.
Overall, these examples illustrate that computer hacking is a risk on social networking sites
to both civilians and governmental officials.
Online Romance Scam/Catfish
Online romance scams, which may be referred to as being cat-fished, are schemes
whereby cyber criminals pretend to be someone else and may seek romance and
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companionship from a potential victim (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2014). Such
criminals search for probable victims through the use of chat rooms, dating sites, and social
networking sites and often use lies and manipulation to trick the victim (Internet Crime
Complaint Center, 2014). Online romance scams are a new form of fraud that became
apparent in 2008 (Whitty & Buchanan, 2012). In these types of scams, victims receive a
double hit-- losing a relationship, and losing money (Whitty & Buchanan, 2012). Online
romance scams do not only rob victims of large sums of money, but they are left to deal with
the psychological aftermath of this form of cybercrime (Whitty & Buchanan, 2012). The
following examples illustrate this form of cyber-crime:
Jennifer, a woman from Buffalo, New York and a mother of two, had been single for
15 years and was ready to look for someone she could spend the rest of her life with;
someone who could be her companion and partner. Unluckily, Jennifer became a
victim of an online romance scam and lost her life’s savings of $50,000. Jennifer met
a man on a dating web site in which she believed was the man of her dreams. They
tended to communicate through the use of emails, text messages, and by the phone.
She liked that he was kind and loving and just fell in love with the man she thought
he was. The relationship was so serious to the point that the man proposed to Jennifer.
He presented himself as being a business man, and one day said he had to leave to
take care of a job overseas. Jennifer by that point, was desperately waiting to meet
him in person. Suddenly, the man began to ask for money giving a reason that since
he was out of the country, he could not attain any of his funds. She was manipulated
by hearing what it was she wanted to hear. Jennifer decided to speak up about her
experience as a victim of an online romance scam to make persons aware that there
are cyber criminals out there who will do anything in their power to attain what it is
they need, such as money (Moretti & Ciotta, 2015).
Manti Te’o, a college football player at the time, was a victim of an online romance
scam that affected him more on the emotional and psychological spectrum. He
became involved with a girl named, Lennay KeKua from Stanford University (ESPN,
2013). They met online, and eventually began speaking on the phone when they
“met” sometime in 2009 (Burke & Dickey, 2013). Te’o and KeKua never met after
that one time he mentioned. Te’o then began to fall in love with her, he stated in an
interview that she was the love of his life (ESPN, 2013). On September 2013, Te’o
announced to media outlets that his grandmother and girlfriend, Lennay, had passed
away (ESPN, 2013). Shortly after, KeKua called Te’o to tell him it was not true, that
she was alive. Sadly, Lennay was not the person he thought she was. He was hoaxed
into believing it was her, and was a victim of a sick joke and experienced pain and
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humiliation (ESPN, 2013). Te’o was not the only one who was contacted by KeKua
and “KeKua” resulted in being a male named Ronaiah Tuiasosopo (ESPN, 2013;
Gutman & Tienabeso, 2013).
As evidenced in the examples above, online romance scams may lead to pain, ridicule,
humiliation, and even the loss of money. While cases differ, the common denominator is that
the victim is deceived when searching for love online. Due to shame and the distraught the
individual may have experienced, that may have deterred him/her from reporting the scam
committed against them (Whitty & Buchanan, 2012).
Cyber Impersonation
Cyber impersonation is defined by Mann (2015) as a cybercriminal hacking into
someone’s account, posing as them and updating their statuses, comments, or sending
messages that will make the individual look bad for the purpose of ruining their reputation,
friendships, and/or to get them in trouble or in danger. T & M Protection Resources (2014)
states that cyber impersonation involves using the Internet to post malevolent, unapproved
content that relates to a specific individual or establishment of a(n) personal profile that has
been designed to give resemblance of an actual existing account (Oluga et al., 2014).
Oftentimes, this cybercrime is committed against an individual without his/her knowledge
because cyber criminals usually make such actions hard to discover (Oluga et al., 2014).
They create false profiles with the use of another individual’s pictures, information, etc.
(Oluga et al., 2014). Below are two cases that involve cyber impersonation.
Daven Lee Nielsen a 54-year old man from Norfolk, Virginia was charged with
online impersonation which is punishable to 10 years in prison as it is a third-degree
felony. Nielsen is not yet in custody but will be punished for impersonating his exgirlfriend and her two daughters on Twitter. Police state that Nielsen created fake
Twitter accounts in which he used to send false, explicit messages to others. He is
punished through the legal system since under the law and the revision of state
legislature, someone can be charged with impersonating someone through the means
of creating a social media profile or other online account. When such a page or profile
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is created without consent from the person, and their information is used to ruin their
self-image it is a crime. When Nielsen was interviewed, he stated he created the
accounts because he was bored and he did not know what he did was illegal (George,
2012).
A 31-year old woman from Austin, Texas was in an unhealthy relationship with
Marcos Lujan for nine months. Shortly, after the relationship ended, Lujan began to
impersonate her online and offered sex for groups of men. He solicited her on
Craigslist, for group sex and investigators found about 1,000 emails between Lujan
and other men. Margaret, the victim, had to face unwelcomed visits late at night from
men Lujan had sent there. Not only did men show up at her home, but presented
themselves at her work too. Lujan was convicted of online impersonation and served
several months then was released. Margaret was diagnosed with Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a result of her experience and wanted to make others
aware that online impersonation can happen to anyone (Lee, 2015).
Online/internet fraud
Online fraud, often referred to as Internet fraud, is a criminal activity involving the
use of a computer and/or an internet connection where a perpetrator may use sophisticated
technological tools to obtain personal information that may result in consequences for a
victim (Legal Information Institute, 2015). Online fraud may involve identity theft or
financial fraud (National Crime Victim Law Institute, 2010). Fraud is an act of intentional
deception for the means of obtaining personal gain and/or to cause a loss to a second party
(Serious Fraud Office, 2015). Online fraud is similar to identity fraud or identity theft
because the term “fraud” includes false statements, deceitful conduct, and/or
misrepresentation (FindLaw, 2015). Two instances of online-fraud are illustrated by the
following cases.
Adrian Ghighnia was indicted on seven counts of wire fraud in the year of 2010 in
Chicago (Department of Justice, 2014). Separately, he was to be indicted by federal
grand juries in the District of Columbia, and Florida. Ghighina admitted to opening
numerous bank accounts with false information (Chicago Tribune, 2011). He had coconspirators that created fraudulent online auctions for expensive items that ranged
from cars to motorcycles and held sales on websites such as eBay, and Craigslist.
(Chicago Tribune, 2011). The money they obtained was sent to one of Ghighina’s
accounts and buyers would never receive the items they purchased (Department of
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Justice, 2014). Ghighina was sentenced to four years in federal prison for his role in
the Internet fraud conspiracy (Chicago Tribune, 2011).
Cameron Harrison pleaded guilty to retaining 260 comprised credit card and debit
card numbers (Mallonee, 2014). He purchased stolen credit card, debit card, and
personal information through an Internet fraud ring known as Carder.su (U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2014). Harrison admitted to being associated
with the Carder.su internet-based, international criminal enterprise organization (U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2014). The organization trafficked account
information, credit/debit card account information, counterfeit identification and
committed crimes such as money laundering, the selling of narcotics, and other
computer crimes (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2014). The criminal
organization was discovered when Harrison was identified by an undercover agent
when he tried to purchase a counterfeit Georgia driver’s license (Mallonee, 2014).
Harrison admitted that the ring used various secure and encrypted emails, chat rooms,
or forums in order to hide their criminal activities from law enforcement and other
criminal internet-based organizations (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
2014). As a result, 26 individuals have been convicted and there are individuals
pending trial or are fugitives (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2014).
Harrison was sentenced to 115 months in a federal prison and was ordered to pay a
total of $50.8 million in restitution given that he stole about $50 million from
innocent Americans (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2014).
Identity theft
Identity theft is a crime and it has become one of the fastest growing crimes in
America (Social Security Administration, 2015). Identity theft is when someone unlawfully
acquires an individual’s personal data in order to use an individual’s private information to
commit theft or fraud (FBI, 2015). Identity theft is the gathering of personal information
without having to break into someone’s home or stealing physical information (Department
of Justice, 2015). Recently, identity theft has become more appealing for criminals in an
online setting (Department of Justice, 2015). They steal personal information by creating
spams, emails, viruses, etc. Furthermore, identity theft includes stealing information such as
passwords, social security numbers, date of birth, passport numbers, death certificates, and
other personal identification information. (FBI, 2015). Stealing an innocent person’s
information can benefit a criminal by applying for loans, credit cards, bank accounts, or
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purchasing expensive materials (Department of Justice, 2015). To further comprehend what
elements may contribute to identity theft crimes, consider the following cases:
Alexander Paul from North Miami stole identities to aid him in taking tax refunds
from innocent people (Department of Justice, 2015). Paul claimed over $109,322
from federal tax refunds having a total of fifty-three tax returns filed (Department of
Justice, 2015). He plead guilty to authorizing access devices, and for aggravated
identity theft. When they searched Paul’s residence, investigators found and seized
evidence of personal identification information from other individuals in two cell
phones, a notebook, and on his computer (Department of Justice, 2015). On August
26, 2015 Paul was sentenced to 31 months, three years supervised release, and was
ordered to pay a total of $18, 469 in restitution (Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
2015).
Michael Floyd White and Sasha Cher-Von Beckett stole identities of many innocent
people. White was punished to 39 months, three years of supervised release, and was
to pay a total of $112,362 in restitution for his role in mail fraud and aggravated
identity theft (Department of Justice, 2014). Co-defendant, Sasha Cher-Von Beckett
was sentenced to 51 months, and three years’ supervised release. Beckett pleaded
guilty to charges on identity theft, access device fraud, and mail fraud (IRS, 2015).
Both, White and Beckett willingly used innocent people’s names, date of birth, and
social security numbers to file false income tax returns to collect refunds for personal
gain (Department of Justice, 2014; IRS, 2015).
Online Victimization and its Consequences
In 2014 alone, the FBI concluded that 9,833 individuals were victims of cybercrimes
on social media outlets (FBI, 2014). The most frequent crimes were online fraud, online
impersonation, and online romance scams (FBI, 2014). Online fraud was ranked as the crime
that caused the most monetary loss for victims followed by online impersonation, and online
romance scams (FBI, 2014). Given that there are approximately 657 million users worldwide
who incorporate some type of online device to use the Internet in their daily lives (Marcum et
al., 2013), individuals tend to engage in activities such as: purchasing online products, email(s), searching for entertainment, news, and managing their investments (Marcum et al.,
2013; Reisig, Pratt, & Holtfreter, 2009; Reisig et al, 2009). Thus, the probability for
victimization is high. In addition to the possibility of monetary loss, research has found that
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victims’ experiences have led some to suicidal ideation, suicide, depression, and other
psychiatric symptoms (Aricak, 2009).
Zhang, Land, and Dick (2010) indicated that cyberbullying constitutes violence that
can lead to physical injuries and/or psychological and/or emotional harm. Individuals often
report suffering from depression, embarrassment, stress, and feeling afraid or emotionally
distressed as a result of being victimized online (Zhang et al., 2010). Online victimization has
correspondingly had reported offline repercussions such as school violence and/or victims
engaging in delinquent acts (Hinduja & Patchin, 2007). Hinduja and Patchin (2007) studied
potential offline consequences as a result of online victimization and found that in regards to
cyberbullying, victims were at risk for “negative developmental and behavioral
consequences” like those listed above (school violence and delinquency) (Hinduja & Patchin,
2007, p. 103). Hinduja and Patchin, (2007) pointed to support that there are psychological
and emotional costs associated with victimization experience in an online environment
(Hinduja & Patchin, 2007).
Furthermore, Wright and Li (2012) examined both face-to-face and cyber
victimization in relevance to cyber-displaced aggression. They found that face-to-face and
cyber victimization both play an important role in cyber-displaced aggression at least six
months after the incidents (Wright & Li, 2012). Cyber-displaced aggression ranges from an
individual feeling anxious to depressed, feeling lonely and performing poorly on given duties
or academics (Wright & Li, 2012). Wright and Li (2012) conducted one of the first studies to
indicate that victims may retaliate against other innocent persons and not necessarily against
the perpetrator who victimized them. The findings of Wright and Li, (2012) are supported by
other studies that state offenders have also experienced victimization (see Cunningham et al.,
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2015; Hinduja & Patchin (2010). Wright and Li (2012) believe that their research can help
future studies to acknowledge that cyber victimization and victimization in an offline setting
may work interactively in producing delinquent behaviors such as aggression.
Not only does the duration and aftermath of a cybercrime experience adversely affect
a victim, it could also impact the offender (Aricak, 2009). In a study conducted by Hinduja
and Patchin (2010), it was found that perpetrators and victims both had suicidal thoughts as a
result of experiencing cybercrime victimization (Schenk & Fremouw, 2012). Research shows
that experiencing victimization such as bullying—both in an online and offline environment
are linked with suicidal ideation for victims and offenders; suicidal ideation is higher for
victims (Hinduja & Patchin, 2010; Schenk & Fremouw, 2012). Those who are bullied or
those who bully tend to think, attempt, or complete suicide and research shows that victims
and perpetrators often experience loneliness, hopelessness, and depression which are all
significant in suicidal ideation (Hinduja & Patchin, 2010).
Victimization Experience
Victimization can vary in severity, intensity, frequency, and diversity (ever
victimized) of victimization experienced. Depending on the cybercrime, victimization may
require law enforcement, medical, and/or psychiatric or mental health assistance since
victims may feel suicidal, depressed, nervous, anxious, or fearful and afraid (Zhang et al.,
2010). With respect to the intensity of victimization, it is possible that individuals experience
repeat victimizations (Ybarra et al., 2012). Thus, it is important to decipher how often an
individual experienced victimization online in a typical week. Additionally, frequency is also
important to understand and study as it is crucial to determine how long (i.e., duration) a user
experienced being a victim or for current victims, how long they have been experiencing
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online victimization. In this study, ever victimized, intensity, and frequency of victimization
will be combined into one variable entitled victimization experience. Ever victimized will
determine if users experienced being victims of cybercrime. It will include six main
cybercrimes: cyber impersonation, online fraud, identity theft, romance scams/catfish,
hacking cyber warfare, and cyberbullying/harassment.
Personal Characteristics
Personal characteristics are important to consider as they may alter an individual’s
severity, intensity, frequency, and the likelihood of being victimized. Therefore, factors such
as—age, sex, educational level, sexual orientation, and ethnicity provide a basis of
understanding cyber-victimization. With respect to ethnicity, there have been little to no
studies that determine the prevalence of online victimization experience by different minority
groups. This is peculiar since there are many studies on victimization of ethnic minority
groups unrelated to cyber space. For instance, the FBI found that roughly 53% of Hispanic
were targeted in a physical environment and 47% of Hispanics were victimized in 2013. The
rate of violent crime involving Hispanic victims tripled from 0.6 per 1,000 persons to 2.0 per
1,000 individuals in 2012 (FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 2015). Homicide is determined to
be the second leading cause of death for Hispanic individuals between the ages of 15 to 24
(Sugarmann, 2014). Hispanics are often victimized or killed by strangers rather than friends
or family (Sugarmann, 2014). Overall, there are a number of studies showing the prevalence
of crime in an offline environment being committed against the Hispanic/Latino population
but limited to no statistics or literature on the amount of Hispanic cybercrime victimization.
When looking at the limited research on cybercrimes, Cunningham et al. (2015)
found that men were more likely than women to be offenders of cybercrime or have

22
experienced both being a victim and being an offender of cybercrime (Aricak, 2009;
Cunningham et al., 2015). Additionally, Reyns et al. (2011) found that females’ likelihood of
victimization is double to their male counterparts. Their chances of being stalked online and
experiencing victimization were 1.8 times higher than males (Reyns et al., 2011). In another
study conducted by MacDonald and Roberts-Pittman (2010), they found that male students
reported bullying others at 11% and have experienced cyberbullying at 22%. On the other
hand, females experienced cyberbullying at 22% and bullied someone else at 8% (McDonald
& Roberts-Pittman (2010). But, MacDonald and Roberts-Pittman (2010) found that there is a
slight difference in the percentage of males and females playing an important factor in
cybercrime victimization. A second study found similar findings in which both males and
females were more likely to cyberbully others on Facebook® if they themselves had
experienced cyberbullying (Marcum et al., 2013). From the above research, one can conclude
that there is little to no difference in the amount of students being victimized or
cyberbullying others.
With respect to sexual orientation, Schwartz (2010) found that students had
committed suicide as a result of being bullied over the Internet because of an individual’s
sexual orientation. The Campus Pride advocate group found that sexual orientation was
related in one out of four reported harassments that led to negative consequences (Schwartz,
2010). Finn (2004) found that the LGBTQ community is likely to experience cyber stalking
or cyberbullying twice as much as heterosexuals. In another study conducted by the Campus
Pride advocate group, it was found that non-heterosexual students between 11 and 22 years
of age had experienced online victimization (Schwartz, 2010). When considering the use of
the Internet by age, the Pew Research Center (2015) found that young adults between the
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ages of 18-29 use and adopt the Internet in their daily lives (Perrin & Duggan, 2015). The
Pew Research Center also found that 95% of adults who are in college or in graduate school
use the Internet more than other subpopulations (Perrin & Duggan, 2015). Educational
attainment is considered to be one of the strongest indicators of determining Internet use for
Americans (Perrin & Duggan, 2015). Since college students have a propensity to routinely
use the internet or electronic media for various reasons ranging from educational purposes to
staying socially connected to others through the use of text messages, chat rooms, social
media outlets, etc. college students are an ideal study population and thus the focus on this
study on cybercrime victimization.
It is noteworthy to discuss why this section focused mainly on cyberbullying. The
reason for this, is due to the extensive attention cyberbullying has received in scholarly
literature. Thus, because of the gap in literature with respect to studying other forms of
cybercrime victimization, this study will help determine whether the information collected
maps onto other forms of cybercrimes (i.e., online romance scams, online fraud, etc.).
Facebook® Utilization
Since there is no precise definition for online activity, for the sake of this study,
online activity will be defined as individuals who use the Internet, primarily Facebook®, for
the purpose of interacting, networking, and/or engaging with others who may be family,
friends, or strangers. Online activity will determine if a person is active or inactive in an
online setting. For instance, since the Internet has become a part of everyday life for many or
all individuals, routinely accessing the Internet for information will be used to construct the
variable Facebook® utilization in this study. While routinely accessing the Internet will likely
lead to being considered as an active user for the purposes of this study, this variable will
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also focus on the number of hours people use the Internet, primarily on Facebook® (Smith,
2016). Statistics show that 91% of millennials use Facebook® and that users tend to spend at
least 20 minutes per day on Facebook® (Smith, 2016). There are limited statistics as to the
number of time spent on Facebook® and the times in which people log onto Facebook®.
Thus, in addition to this variable, participants will be asked at what times they are likely to
log onto Facebook®, and if they log on during work, school, or both.
Research Participants
Research on victimization in cyberspace is still in its infancy –and the majority of
available studies have been: (1) exploratory in nature and (2) focused on adolescent samples.
However, there are reasons to pay closer attention to victimization of college students. First,
93% of college students use social networking sites at higher rates than adults (Lenhart et al.,
2010; Lindsay & Krysik, 2012). The majority of college students fall under the millennials
category which includes individuals who are between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four.
Statistics show that 91% of millennials use Facebook® and that users tend to spend at least 20
minutes per day on Facebook® (Smith, 2016). Second, Identity Guard Resource Center
(2015) stated that college students are disproportionately susceptible to being victims of
identity theft, and they are slow at discovering they are victims of cybercrime. Also, there has
only been a few studies conducted on the college student population in regards to cybercrime
victimization. The majority of studies focus on adolescent or high school students (Marcum
et al., 2010). While Marcum, Ricketts, and Higgins (2010) state that adolescents and younger
adults are a population with one of the fastest growing rates of Internet use, it is equally if not
more important to consider the college student population because they are also identified as
an at-risk group for various experiences, especially cybercrime (Reyns et al., 2011). Their

25
risk is due to college students routinely connecting to the Internet to complete coursework
requirements such as research papers, assignments, etc. (Reyns et al., 2011).
Admittedly, the knowledge of cybercrimes being committed worldwide is unknown.
Such a lack of knowledge regarding the kinds and frequencies of cybercrime worldwide may
be due to two fundamental difficulties that do not allow for accurate statistics (Kabay, 2013).
The two problems preventing accurate statistics are detection and reporting (Kabay, 2013).
Brandl (2014) states that online victimization when concerning college students may be
anywhere between ten to forty-two percent. Since it is difficult to have precise statistics as to
the number of individuals falling victims to cybercrimes, it is difficult to determine the
severity, intensity, extensity, and diversity of victimization. Choi (2008), found that college
students who neglect having computer-security software are more likely to be victimized
than other students who do not neglect installing such software. When considering literature
on the extant topic, research shows that numerous studies have been conducted in regards to
college student’s perceptions and attitudes of the Internet and their behaviors (Lindsay &
Krysik, 2012). But, when taking Internet-related risk into consideration, little attention has
been given to the dangers that college students may encounter on the Internet (Lindsay &
Krysik, 2012).
Lifestyle-Routine Activity Theory (LRAT)
Lifestyle theory is considered to be a personal victimization theory that was first
developed by theorists Michael Hindelang, Michael Gottfredson, and James Garafalo in 1979
(Jenson & Brownfield, 1986). Lifestyles, in relation to the theory, entails what people do on a
daily basis: the patterns, routines, and activities they engage in during their daily lives
including leisure, work, home, school, and evening recreational activities (Myrstol &
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Chermak, 2005). According to theorists Hinelandg, Gottfredson, and Garafalo, an
individual’s “lifestyles” can predict the likelihood of victimization (Myrstol & Chermak,
2005). However, the centerpiece of the theory hinges on the time people spend in public
places, their personal characteristics, and the interaction with offenders, which may be
unknown to the individual (Jenson & Brownfield, 1986). Thus, lifestyles are of great
importance because they can determine the degree to which individuals interact with
motivated offenders in the absence of capable guardians (Jenson & Brownfield, 1986). In
essence, the theory’s focus is on the characteristics or personal characteristics of victims that
can enable them to be vulnerable targets (Jenson & Brownfield, 1986).
Routine activity theory is best known for the expansion of lifestyle theory and will be
discussed in more detail below. Routine activity theory was developed by criminologists
Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson in 1979 (Frailing & Harper, 2013). Cohen and Felson
(1979) state that people’s daily routines may put an individual at higher risks of victimization
than others. Three elements are required in order to produce a crime: a motivated offender, a
potential target, and the lack of a capable guardian (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Crime occurs
when a motivated offender encounters a suitable target in the absence of a capable guardian
(Cohen & Felson, 1979). According to the theory, the probability of victimization decreases
in the presence of a capable guardian (Cohen & Felson, 1979). When applied to cyber
victimizations, a motivated offender may be found in a variety of cyber locales: chat rooms,
shopping websites, social networks, etc. Potential targets or victims can be any individual
who spends time using the Internet but, the more an individual spends time online the higher,
the chances of them being victimized by potential offenders (Reyns et al, 2011). Reyns,
Henson, and Fisher (2011) state that increase in internet usage increases target attractiveness.
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Attractiveness also increases when an individual posts personal information such as their:
relationship status, e-mail addresses, sexual orientation, activities, photos, height, and weight
(Reyns et al., 2011).
In an online setting, capable guardianship can be measured as not having both a
firewall or security program installed in a user’s computer (Reyns et al., 2011). As stated
previously, people who spend more time online have a greater chance of being victimized of
cybercrime. Without having a degree of security measures possible, the chances of a user
being victimized online increases (Frailing & Harper, 2013; Reyns et al., 2011).
Additionally, there were physical and social characteristics said to influence the likelihood of
victimization online, but it was not clear as to what this meant as a result of limited empirical
research (Holt & Bossler, 2009). In addition, as cited earlier, anti-virus programs and
firewalls serve as a physical component to computers and Internet connections (Holt &
Bossler, 2009). These types of programs are used as physical guardians from computer bugs,
malicious software, and system invasions that tend to threaten lines of communication (Holt
& Bossler, 2009). In the social guardian spectrum, this includes owners updating their antivirus programs, firewalls, and Internet browsers to reduce the likelihood of experiencing
victimization (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Holt & Bossler, 2009; Wall, 2008).
In the current study, lifestyle theory and routine activity theory will be combined due
to their similarities, and will be referred to as LRAT. Given that routine activity theory is an
expansion of that of lifestyle theory, integrating both theories is beneficial in the examination
of online victimization experience. Other researchers have also combined lifestyle-routine
activity theory such as Holt and Bossler (2009) in their examination of applying LRAT to
cybercrime victimization. A second study, along with many others includes Reyns et al.,
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(2011) where they applied LRAT to cyber stalking victimization. Furthermore, since both
theories intertwine, combining them in representing daily activities, patterns, and routines is
beneficial for researchers.
Researchers posit that cybercrime may be explained by LRAT. For instance, Holt and
Bossler (2008) found a positive correlation between the total number of hours an individual
spends online and the likelihood of him/her being victimized. Holt and Bossler’s, (2008)
study focused on a particular form of cybercrime—online harassment and their study was
used to test the LRAT in regards to online victimization. They examined computer usage,
time spent online, social guardianship, motivated offenders, and potential targets (Holt &
Bossler, 2008). Holt and Bossler (2008) found in their analysis that constructs of LRAT do
apply to cybercrime. Additionally, they found it important to identify the association between
victimization and delinquent acts, to include gender because females tend to be victimized at
higher rates than males, and that online activity (i.e., regular use of computer-mediated
communications) play an important role in cybercrime victimization (Holt & Bossler, 2008).
Results of another study suggest that when a motivated offender and a potential target
intersect within a network, victimization is likely to take place (Reyns, 2013). Reyns (2013)
aimed at applying the LRAT to crimes where an offender and a victim never come into direct
contact. Reyns, (2013) examined victims of identity theft and an individual’s daily routines
while also considering their characteristics, and perceived risks of identity theft
victimization. He states that there should be continuous research done on LRAT in order to
expand its approach into considering offenses where a victim and an offender never come
into physical contact with one another (Reyns, 2013). Reyns, (2013) did find support for the
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application of LRAT to the explanation of online victimization given that his study proposes
crimes do not only occur in direct contact but, may occur through internet connections.
But, there have been convincing arguments by other researchers that components of
LRAT may not be suitable or adaptable to online victimization (Reyns et al., 2011). For
instance, even though there are three basic tenets used in explaining conventional crime in a
physical setting. Yar (2005) disputes that LRAT elements are not suitable for applying to
cybercrimes (Reyns et al., 2011). Yar (2005) explains that one of the main elements LRAT
holds is that time and space are central in explaining criminal activity (Reyns et al., 2011).
As a result, because both space and time are essential in using the theory to explain crime,
cybercrimes may not be explained by applying LRAT to an online environment (Reyns et al.,
2011; Yar 2005). Since a victim and an offender must intersect for a crime to occur, in
cyberspace an offender and a victim do not come together in the same physical environment
which is the reason why many researchers believe LRAT may not be used to explain
cybercrime (Reyns et al., 2011). Accordingly, researchers argue that LRAT is either limited
to only place-based crimes or it simply needs revision to include other crimes where a victim
and an offender do not have contact with one another in a physical environment (Reyns et al.,
2011; Tillyer & Eck, 2009).
LRAT, however, can be revised to include contact between an offender and a victim,
in an online setting. This may take place when the offender and the victim’s network devices
come into contact with one another (Reyns et al., 2011). Reyns (2013) states that some
criminologists have recognized the advancements in the technological world, and as a result,
they are now aware there has been a creation of new opportunities for crime and
victimization to occur. Reyns (2013) positions that the Internet has created new opportunities
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of crime to take place not only in a traditional environment but in a new environment—the
online world. While the theory was created by Cohen and Felson in 1979 when the Internet
was non-existent (Reyns, 2013), Cohen and Felson did note that technological and other
structural advances would “influence the nature of criminal victimization” (Cohen & Felson,
1979, p. 591; Pratt, Holtfreter, & Reisig, 2010).
The applicability of LRAT to the online environment continues to be debated (Pratt et
al., 2010) but arguments are tipping in favor of applying LRAT to cybercrimes. One of the
primary arguments in favor of its applicability is the simple fact that people are using the
Internet on a daily basis. File and Ryan (2014) found that 74.4% of U.S. households reported
Internet use, and 83.3% reported owning a device that connects to the Internet. This comes to
demonstrate how our world has become reliant on technology. Thus, the growth in remote
activities has now shifted arguments in favor of the application of LRAT (Reyns, 2013) to
cyberspace. Eck and Clarke (2003) suggest that LRAT could be modified to accommodate
the necessity of space and time because there is contact of one network with another. Even
though a motivated offender and a victim did not come to direct contact, the fact that one
network overlapped with another is what allows an offender to victimize an individual
(Reyns, 2013).
Also, the motivated offender component represented in this theory may be measured
by considering the amount of time the user spends in an online environment (Bossler, Holt,
& May, 2012). Additionally, asking various questions in regards to computer deviance and
actions taken in an online environment may determine whether or not the users may be a
motivated offender (Bossler et al., 2012). A suitable target may be measured by taking into
consideration demographic characteristics since research shows that motivated offenders take
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characteristics of an individual into consideration to determine who to victimize (Bossler et
al., 2012). Lastly, the lack of a capable guardian element may be measured by determining
whether or not the user had a security program installed in his/her computer, whether or not
the user incorporated firewalls, and the amount of information provided online such as a
user’s address, or work place. It could also be measured by the extent to which users
incorporate other prevention measures, which will be discussed below.
Prevention Measures
There are certain safety precautions users can take in an online environment. Dailylife patterns and activities of an individual offline and online will determine the likelihood of
an individual being victimized (Davis & Smith, 1994). Security measures or safety
precautions can include: running and updating anti-virus programs they have installed in their
computers, ensuring they have a running firewall, securing and using difficult passwords, and
conducting updates needed in a user’s computer (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010). Wall (2008)
found that if a user had a reliable security program installed and updated Internet browsers,
then those users reduced their likelihood of experiencing online victimization. Norton by
Symantec (2015) provides prevention tips for online users such as: making sure a user’s
computer has the latest updates, using strong passwords that are also not shared with anyone,
protecting and not distributing their personal information, protecting a computer with
updated security software programs, and reviewing financial institution statements regularly
to avoid becoming a victim of cybercrime. Since users are at a place where they can be
vulnerable, securing devices that connect to the Internet is a serious factor that must be met
by security policies to ensure a user’s personal information is safe and secure from motivated
offenders (Wall, 2008).
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In this study, the importance of the prevention measures variable will be tested to
determine whether such measures impact utilization and victimization experience. This will
be done by analyzing the importance of having mutual friends, the number of mutual friends
(mutuality), recognition of a user’s profile name and user profile photo, and the degree of
user control. Determining the number of users being victimized online, will be measured by
the number of mutual friends a user has with a person attempting to add him/her on
Facebook® and recognition (whether the user knows who is the person requesting a friend
acceptance on their Facebook® profile). This variable will be measured by four different
categories. The first level will involve a low number of mutual friends and the user knowing
who is trying to add him/her. The second level will involve the user having a high number of
mutual friends and knowing who is trying to add the user. The third category will involve a
high number of mutual friends and the user not knowing the person. The last category will
represent a low number of mutual friends and a user not knowing who the individual is. In
accordance to prevention measures, the degree of user control will be evaluated to determine
whether or not it correlates to cybercrime victimization. This variable will be analyzed by
determining whether a user’s Facebook® account/profile is set to private or public in
reference to photos, videos, comments, posts, etc. and whether or not that impacts to
probability of being victimized on Facebook®.
Being able to determine whether a respondent knows who sent them a friend request
on Facebook®, will allow one to determine if a user’s probability of being victimized is
higher or lower based on friend mutuality and recognition. This measure will assist research
by incorporating how an individual decides to add or delete a friend request. Moreover, since
there has been noted research on who is more likely to engage in cybercrime—the mutuality
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and recognition dimensions should aid in distinguishing who is more likely to partake in
committing cybercrime. For example, Cunningham et al. (2015), found that a large
percentage of students who reported being victims of cybercrime were committed by friends
and/or acquaintances of the victims (Cunningham et al., 2015). Wolak, Mitchell, and
Finkelhor (2007) piloted a study on online harassment which is known as cyberbullying and
stated that cyberbullying tends to focus on offenders who are peers of a victim; but youth in
the study also reported being victimized by people they only knew and met online (Wolak et
al., 2007). Cyberbullying is now considered one of the most prominent types of cybercrimes,
like online fraud, online impersonation, and identity theft (Hinduja & Patchin, 2007). Wolak
et al. (2007) found that harassment incidents were being committed by peers more repeatedly
than by individuals the victim only came into contact with online. A second study of students
at the University of New Hampshire found that students received e-mails and messages from
chat rooms that were harassing in nature from strangers they met online, acquaintances, and
significant others (Finn, 2004). Thus, this measure will shed light on the decision-making
process for adding or deleting a friend request.
Furthermore, focusing on the likelihood that a user decides to add or delete a friend
request in pertinence to the number of mutual friends and recognition will aid in measuring
whether or not this variable plays a key role in the probability of a Facebook® user becoming
a victim of cybercrime. If so, this construct will be able to be used in the future when
conducting additional research on cybercrime and prevention measures in regards to—
Facebook®.
Below is a graphic depiction of the conceptual model that will be used in this study.
While all constructs will be fully explained in forthcoming sections, the model tells us that
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prevention measures will moderate or impact the strength of the relationship between
Facebook® utilization and victimization experience. Additionally, the models tells us that
personal characteristics directly affect victimization experience.

Figure 2.1 Conceptual Model

Personal Characteristics
Prevention Measures

Facebook Utilization

Victim Experience
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Study Location
The study was conducted in Laredo, Texas at Texas A&M International University
(TAMIU). Laredo is located along the southwest border of Mexico. It has a population of
approximately 255,473 people who are mainly of Hispanic origin (96%) (United States
Census Bureau, 2015). Laredo has an average crime rate of 331 per 100,000 population,
while the crime rate for the U.S. is an average of 257 per 100,000 population. Concerning
cybercrime rates in Laredo, there are no statistics at this given time. However, Texas has
been rated the third state out of ten top states for cybercrime as of 2014 in regards to the total
number of complaints and money loss amounts in respects to cyber victimization (Internet
Crime Complaint Center, 2014).
TAMIU is a 4-year public institution. TAMIU is predominantly an undergraduate
institution, with 88.6% of its student population being undergraduate students. Current
enrollment at TAMIU is approximately 7,400 students. In fall 2015, TAMIU’s student
population consisted of 59.4% female, 40.6% male, 92.7% Hispanic, 56% of all
undergraduates are low income (eligible for Pell Grants) and 79% of freshman are low
income, and 59.2% first-generation college students.
Sampling Technique and Sample
The study aimed at surveying two hundred to three hundred undergraduate, Hispanic
college students currently enrolled at TAMIU in the criminal justice and psychology
program—two of the largest undergraduate programs at the university. The primary goal of
this study was to obtain a representative sample of students enrolled at TAMIU. However,
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due to logistical challenges, a non-random or non-probability sample was obtained.
Specifically, two separate sampling techniques were used. First, students who voluntarily
enrolled in the SONA system, a cloud-based software environmental management system
which aids universities in managing research studies and recruiting participants online
(SONA Systems, 2016) was utilized to recruit students for the present study. The second
sampling technique involved classroom visits to two criminal justice courses in the summer
of 2016.
It is important to note that non-probability samples are commonly used in social
science research and they are primarily used due to their accessibility and proximity to the
researcher. Additionally, participants who volunteered and decided to participate in this study
had to do so willingly. This is due to the SONA system allowing students who are interested
in participating in the study to take the survey if they wish to do so and by professors
providing extra credit if they would like to participate in the study. The reason for using such
technique was because there was not enough time to use a random sampling technique and
because there were no means to print over two-hundred copies the survey.
Instrument
The survey questionnaire asked questions regarding victimization experience,
Facebook® utilization, personal characteristics, and prevention measures. Questions were
based on various Likert-type scales ranging from 1= Always to 5= Never, 1= Not Important
to 3= Very Important, and 1= Not at all severe to 10= Extremely severe. Additionally,
questions were answerable by yes/no, time ranges, and fill in the box. Various techniques
were used to gain meaningful information to test the hypothesis. A sample of the
questionnaire is found in Appendix A.
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The survey was created to focus solely on Facebook® users and most of it was based
on previous research/survey instruments. Back (2016), for instance, assessed a survey
instrument that concentrated on determining what social networking sites were mostly used,
the time spend online, the reasons a user engaged online, and the experiences users had.
Incorporating some of Back’s ideas aided in creating a valuable survey instrument given that
the goal of this study was to determine the time a user spends online, if they are active online,
and the victimization experiences they have had. Back’s (2016) survey was an important tool
in the creation of my survey instrument.
Prior to data from respondents, this study and its survey instrument was submitted for
IRB approval. IRB approval is needed for any study involving human subjects (American
University, 2015). An IRB ensures that the privacy and safety of the respondents are not
violated in any way. It also ensures that informed consent form participants, or human
subjects, is sought and that participation is voluntary. Because the study involved human
subjects, informed consent forms were required for this study.
Hypothesis
The study had one core hypothesis followed by several sub-hypotheses:
Core hypothesis: Facebook® utilization (i.e., online activity and/or number of hours
spent online) will impact online victimization, but such experience is moderated by the type
of prevention measure (e.g., the number of mutual friends and the recognition of friend
requests, and the degree of user control pertaining to what type of information they allow to
be public or private).
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H2: Individuals who review their security settings to ensure the public does not have
access to his/her profile are less likely to be victims of cybercrime unlike individuals who do
not review their privacy/security settings (degree of user control).
H3: Users’ who constantly spend time on Facebook® are more likely to have
experienced online victimization compared to individuals who spend less time on the
Facebook®.
H4: Facebook® users who do not take the number of mutual friends (mutuality) into
consideration are more likely to experience victimization than users who do not accept friend
requests if they have a low number of mutual friends.
H5: Participants who do not recognize a user’s profile picture or username and accept
a friend request are more likely to experience victimization than users who take those
elements into consideration (recognition).
MEASUREMENT
Dependent variable
The construct of “victimization experience” was measured using four dimensions:
intensity, frequency, severity, and ever victimized. The questions pertaining to this construct
were either binary, nominal or ordinal level measurements. Each question was answerable by
a yes (1) or no (0) or a list of five to nine answer choices in order to obtain a better
understanding of how many times they have experienced a cyber-victimization and the
frequency and severity of their experience. An example of a questions is: “How many times
in the past 12 months have you experienced victimization on Facebook®?” The reason a time
frame of twelve months is used here is because Neuman (2011) states that a researcher is to
avoid false premises, distant future intention questions, and should avoid asking question
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beyond a respondent’s capabilities. Additionally, most questions are answerable by a number
to determine how long ago they experienced cybercrime victimization, how long it lasted,
how many times they experienced it, and how severe their experience was. For example,
participants are asked, “How long did it last?” (Recall this question is a follow-up to a yes or
no question) and the answer choices range from “0 to 1 year,” “1 to 2 years,” “2 to 3 years,”
and so forth. Six types of cybercrimes are examined and asked specific questions in regards
to the type of crime. An illustration of the type of questions asked is: “Has anyone ever
threatened you by sending you fearful messages, pictures, videos, or spreading rumors or
untruthful facts about you on Facebook®? (Cyberbullying/Harassment).” Each question like
the example provided above were answerable by yes (1) or no (0).
Cybercrime Victimization Experience
Experience was measured using a dichotomous variable that pertains to the question
“Have you ever experienced cyber victimization on Facebook®?” A yes was coded as 1 and a
no was coded as 0. Any respondent who answered yes to any one of the six listed crimes was
scored as 1.
Ever Victimized
For ever victimized, this dimension was a derived variable consisting of six out
regional variables answerable by yes= 1, no= 0. To measure this dimension of experience six
different questions were used to determine whether a respondent had experienced being
hacked, was a victim of cyber-impersonation, cyberbullying, identity theft, an online
romance scam, and/or online fraud on Facebook®. For instance, I asked questions to the
nature of: “Has anyone ever threatened you by sending you fearful messages, pictures,
videos, or spreading rumors or untruthful facts about you on Facebook®?” Each question
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pertaining to the type of victimization questions asked were coded as 1= Yes or 0= No. The
sum of the responses to the six listed items were calculated. I added them and the maximum
total was six. The maximum number of six (6) indicated high victimization experience, and a
minimum of zero (0) designated no victimization. Given these values, the level of
measurement for this measure is at the ratio level of measurement since an absolute zero is a
possible score.
Frequency of Experience
To measure frequency of experience I used the question: “How many times did you
experience this type of cyber-crime?” This question was used for all six types of cybercrimes
being examined if the respondent answered 1= yes. However, I calculated the midpoints of
the interval level questions and used this as my ultimate measure of frequency. For example,
for question 30, referenced above (refer to Appendix A), had four different answer choices.
Respondents were able to answer: (1) 1 to 2, (2) 3 to 4; (3) 5 to 6, (4) 7+. In this case, since
the midpoints were used, each answered response was recoded as: (1) 1.5, (2) 3.5, (3) 5.5, (4)
7; this was done to obtain the midpoint value.
Severity of Experience
To measure the severity of cybercrime victimization, I used the question: “Which of
the following describes the severity of your victimization experience?” This question had
four subset questions that determined whether a respondent had to consult with a medical
doctor, report the incident to Facebook® to deactivate the account, had to report the incident
to law enforcement, and/or if the respondent had to consult with a psychologist. The question
was answerable by a Likert-type scale ranging from 1= Not at all severe to 10= Extremely
severe making it a nominal level measurement. Each response category were added to
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determine which type of cybercrime victimization was more severe. This was done by
creating a severity index which we added the numbers listed for all four sub-set questions
regarding the severity of the participant’s experience.
Intensity of Experience
To measure intensity of victimization experience, I used the question “For how many
years have you been using Facebook®?” This question was used for all six types of
cybercrimes being examined if the respondent answered 1= yes. The question was
answerable by writing in the number of years in a text box—making it a ratio level
measurement.
Independent Variables
Control variables
I measured the construct of cybercrime victimization on Facebook® by using three
main concepts. The first concept, personal characteristics had five subset variables being:
age, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and classification. These variables were measured
using a nominal level of measurement except for age being an interval-ratio level. Age was
determined based on the year the respondent was born; for example, 1990. Gender was coded
as: Male (0); Female (1). Ethnicity had two nominal categories being: Hispanic (1); NonHispanic (0). Sexual orientation was coded as Heterosexual (1); Homosexual (2); Bisexual
(3); Questioning (4). Lastly, classification was coded as: freshman (1), sophomore (2), junior
(3), senior (4).
Facebook® Utilization
The second independent variable, Facebook® utilization, was measured using nine to
eleven questions which were answerable using an ordinal or interval level of measurement
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which were recoded into a ratio level of measurement. This independent variable was
answerable by one of the following: yes (1); no (0), single text box, Monday (1), Tuesday
(2), Wednesday (3), Thursday (4), Friday (5), Saturday (6), Sunday (7), or 0 to <20 minutes
(1), 30 minutes to <1 hour (2), 1 hour to <2 hours (3), 2 hours to <3 hours (4), 3 to <4 hours
(5), 4 hours+ (6). For some questions, responses would continue to: 4 hours to <5 hours (6), 5
hours+ (7). Other responses ranged from: only friends (private) (1), just me (2), everyone
(public) (3) or close friends (1) to everyone (strangers) (7). The construct of Facebook®
utilization had two sub concepts that of intensity and extensity. I measured Facebook®
extensity of use by asking the question “For how many years have you been using
Facebook®?” Extensity is a ratio level of measurement. On the other hand, the intensity of
Facebook® use was measured by asking, “On average, how many hours/minutes a day do you
spend on Facebook®?” From the categories given, I calculated the midpoint of each category
and made the response itself a midpoint, the original coding was not used in the survey. The
recode gave a semblance to a ratio level variable.
Prevention Measures
Prevention measures was measured by asking: How important are the following in
accepting a Facebook® friend request? The questions were in regards to how important the
number of mutual friends is, how many mutual friends must one have to accept a friend
request, the importance of recognizing a user’s profile and username, and what types of
information they have set to private or public in regards to the degree of user control. The
variable was answerable by: Not Important (1), Important (2), Very Important (3). If the
number of mutual friends is important then participants were asked how many mutual friends
they must have to accept a friend request. That questions were answerable by: 0 (1), 1-5 (2),
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6-10 (3), 11+ (4). In regards to recognition, this construct was measured by asking a
respondent: “How important is it to recognize a Facebook® user’s profile photo and
username?” They were answerable by: Not Important (1), Important (2), Very Important (3).
Lastly, the degree of user control was measured by asking respondents: “Who can view your:
posts, videos, personal information, status updates, and photos?” These questions with the
five categories were answerable by: Everyone (1) (Public), Only Friends (2) (Private). A
copy of the survey questions is found in Appendix A.
Analytical Strategy
I used a generalized regression model meaning that I applied different types of
regression link functions: binary logistic and normal error. For the binary dependent variable
(1= Yes, 0= No), I used a binary, logistic regression approach. For the three sub-dependent
variables (frequency, intensity, and severity) I applied a multiple linear regression analysis.
For measurements of intensity, the response categories were recoded into midpoints, then a
multiple linear regression model was applied. Using midpoints ensured that no valuable
response data was lost as a result of the dichotomous variable.
Additionally, it is vital to mention that for the prevention measure of mutuality, I used
a principal component analysis (PCA). A PCA is a statistical technique used to reduce the
number of variables to a more parsimonious and trackable set of theoretical variables (PCs);
these theoretical variables are linear combinations of the original variables. In other words,
PCA is used to transform a large number of correlated variables into a smaller set of
uncorrelated components (Alani, 2014). In this particular study, since the two dimensions of
mutuality being number (1= 0, 2= 3, 3= 8, 4= 11+) and importance (1=Not important, 2=
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Important, 3= Very Important) were fundamentally different in metrics, I could not use a
simple average. Instead, PCA was used to combine both dimensions.
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Chapter 4
Results
Overview
My conceptual framework casted four core constructs: (1) personal characteristics,
(2) prevention measures, (3) Facebook® utilization, and (4) online victimization experience.
Each of these constructs consisted of sub-dimensions. For instance, personal characteristics
had the sub-dimensions of age, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, classification, and sex.
Prevention measures had three sub-dimensions that of: (i) mutuality, (ii) recognition, and (iii)
degree of user control. Facebook® utilization had the sub-dimensions of (i) intensity and (ii)
extensity of utilization. Lastly, victimization experience had the sub-dimensions: ever
victimized, and further conceptually split into intensity, frequency, and severity. The central
hypothesis is: Facebook® utilization impacts victimization experience with the type of
prevention measure used moderating the impact of Facebook® utilization on victimization
experience. Put another way, it was predicted that prevention measures will condition the
effect of Facebook® utilization on victimization experience.
Descriptive Statistics
My descriptive statistics results indicate that majority of respondents were female
(74%), between ages 19 and 22, inclusive, and were mostly non-seniors in terms of student
classification (53%). The reason that classification was recoded into a dummy variable 1=
senior, 0= non-senior was a result of rather very uneven distribution among the
classification’s categories. In this recode, non-senior represents freshman, sophomores, and
juniors, while the senior’s category only represents seniors.
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Although, it was initially imagined that there would be five sub-dimensions for
personal characteristics, both data pertaining to ethnicity and sexual orientation could not be
used in a meaningful way due to an empirical distribution that heavily represented Hispanic
Americans, and heterosexuals. This is for the reason that 95% of respondents were Hispanics,
and 94% were heterosexual which—in turn led to excluding both dimensions in the
regression models. Excluding both ethnicity and sexual orientation was a necessary because
if they would have been kept, the data would tilt more toward one category than other
important measurements; thus, making estimates based on these variables unreliable due to
the small sample sizes for these non-dominant categories.
In regards to Facebook® utilization, the majority of respondents stated they spent less
than an hour a week on Facebook® (intensity; 34%) and had been using Facebook® for an
average of six years (extensity; 23%). Focusing now on the moderating variables or
prevention measures, in regards to the measurement of mutuality, most respondents found it
very important (66%) to have mutual friends and indicated they needed to have between one
and five friends 42%, in order to accept a friend request. When considering recognition,
respondents found it to be not only important (46%) but, very important (46%) in being able
to recognize a user’s profile name. Additionally, respondents believed it was very important
(56%) to recognize a user’s profile photo to accept a friend request. Lastly, with respect to
degree of user control, note that there were five items used to create the scale to measure user
control: (i) posts, (ii) personal information, (iii) videos, (iv) photos, and (v) status updates. In
examining the data further, only responses pertaining to posts and personal information could
be used since there was a large number of missing values for the other three items. Most
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respondents had their posts set to private (86%) and had their personal information set to
public (68%). Descriptive statistics for variables of the study is given in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Independent Variables
Age

Min.

Max.

M1

S.D.2

20.50

27.0

23.3

2.63

Senior (1= Senior, 0= Non-Senior)

0.00

1.00

0.47

0.50

Male (1= Male, 0= Female)

0.00

1.00

0.26

0.44

Intensity (# of hours per week)

0.50

5.00

2.49

1.84

0.00

10.00

5.67

2.41

1.00

3.00

2.56

0.67

0.00

11.00

6.49

3.82

1.00

3.00

2.38

0.63

1.00

3.00

2.53

0.57

0.00

1.00

.142

0.35

0.00

1.00

.678

0.47

Extensity (# of years)
Importance of Mutual Friend (1= Not Imp, 2= Imp, 3= Very Imp)
Number of Mutual Friend (1=0, 2= 1-5, 3= 6-10, 4= 11+)
Recognition of User Name (1= Not Imp, 2= Imp, 3= Very Imp)
Recognition of User Profile Photo (1= Not Imp, 2= Imp, 3= Very Imp)
Posts (1= Public, 0= Private)
Personal Information (1= Public, 0= Private)
N= 209
1 is the overall average.
2 measures the amount of variation within the data values

Dependent Variable Overview
In exploring the dependent variable and its four sub-dimensions, it is best to begin by
explaining what variables were used within the model. Examining the variables within the
model will allow to determine whether or not there are predictors of victimization
experience. The regression model used for all four sub-dimensions of victimization
experience included the independent variables of age, sex, classification (personal
characteristics), intensity, extensity (Facebook® utilization), degree of user control,
mutuality, and recognition (prevention measures). These are used along with six interaction
terms1, namely: Intensity X Degree of user control, Intensity X Mutuality, Intensity X
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Recognition, and Extensity X Degree of user control, Extensity X Mutuality, and Extensity X
Recognition. These interaction terms represent the moderating effects of prevention measures
on the relationships between Facebook® utilization and victimization experience.
In analyzing the dependent variable of ever victimized (Y1), the entire sample size of
n=209 respondents was used. For intensity (Y2), severity (Y3), and frequency (Y4) of
victimization only the n=95 respondents who have ever experienced online victimization
were used. Beginning with ever victimized, (Y1), a binary logistic regression analysis was
performed because this dimension was answerable by 1=yes, 0=no (Table 4.2). For the
remaining three dimensions frequency, intensity, and severity a multiple linear regression
analyses was used (Appendix B).
Ever victimized (Y1) revealed that the top three types of cybercrimes that Hispanic
students at TAMIU experienced were cyber-bullying (27%), online romance scams (18%),
and online fraud (10%). The 52% (n=95) who answered they have experienced online
victimization will be applied to the multiple linear regression analysis models for intensity
(Y2), severity (Y3), and frequency (Y4).
Regression Results
Victimization Experience – For the outcome variable “ever victimized” (Y1), the
overall regression model was significant (p<0.01) (Table 4.2). The results associated with
this model revealed no moderating effects. This means that there were no significant
interaction terms. However, there were three significant variables: males (p = 0.001),
intensity of Facebook® utilization (= 0.017), and degree of user control (p = 0.019). Since no
interaction term was statistically significant, results mean that gender, intensity of Facebook®
use, and degree of user control directly influence victimization experience. From the results,
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the odds of males experiencing online victimization is 0.21 times [i.e, exp(B) = 0.21] that of
females. Furthermore, results indicate that as the amount of time spent on Facebook®
(intensity) increases by one hour per week, the odds of experiencing online victimization is
magnified by 1.25 times [i.e., exp(B) =1.25].
For example, if one person spends 5 hours a day on Facebook® while another person
only spends 4 hours a day engaging on Facebook®, the person who spends 1 hour more on
Facebook® increases his/her odds of experiencing online victimization by 1.25x higher than
the amount spent by the person who only uses Facebook® for 4 hours a day. Lastly, the
model indicates that when considering degree of user control, the odds of individuals
experiencing online victimization for those who have their privacy settings set to public, is
almost 3X [exp(B) = 2.8] that of individuals who have their privacy settings set to private.
In Table 4.2, the terms that have to do with the moderation hypothesis (i.e. H2, H4,
H5), were not significant at the 5% level. For example, the interaction between Facebook®
intensity and prevention measure degree of user control, is not a significant term (Intensity X
Degree of User Control: B = +.023; exp(B) = 1.023; p>.05). Additionally, the interaction
between intensity and mutuality, is also not significant (Intensity X Mutuality: B = -0.272;
exp(B) = .076; p>.05). The interaction term between Facebook® intensity and prevention
measure recognition, is again not significant (B = -0.034; exp(B) = 0.967; p>.05). The
remaining three interaction terms between Facebook® extensity and prevention measures
degree of user control (Extensity X Degree of User Control: B = -0.202; exp(B) = 0.817;
p>.05), mutuality (Extensity X Mutuality: B = +0.138; exp(B) = 1.148; p>.05), and
recognition (Extensity X Recognition: B = -0.337; exp(B) = 0.714; p>.05) were not
significant.
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Table 4.2. Binary Logistic Regression for Ever Victimized
independent variables

B

Age
Senior (1=senior, 0=not senior)
Male (1=male, 0=female)
Intensity of FB utilization (# in hours per week)
Extensity of FB utilization (# in years)
Degree of User Control (1= Public, 0= Private)
Mutuality (PCA derived)

1

Recognition (Mean derived)²

S.E.

exp(B)

p-value

-2.667

1.625

0.069

.101

-.096

.071

0.908

.176

-.022

.374

0.978

.953

-1.540

.459

0.214

.001**

.228

.096

1.257

.017*

-.042
1.054

.094
.448

0.959
2.868

.655
.019*

-.071

.201

0.931

.724

-.707

.487

0.493

.147

.023

.112

1.023

.841

Intensity X Mutuality

-.272

.279

0.762

.330

Intensity X Recognition

-.034

.238

0.967

.887

Extensity X Degree of User Control

-.202

.235

0.817

.390

.138

.093

1.148

.139

-.337

.238

0.714

.156

Intensity X Degree of User Control

Extensity X Mutuality
Extensity X Recognition
R

2

p-value
df

.207
.0100

152

N=209
1

dervied by PCA of number (1= 0, 2= 3, 3= 8, 4= 11+; Midpoints) and importance (1,2,3).

²derived by simple average; 1=Not Imp, 2=Imp, 3=Very Imp

Frequency of Victimization Experience - On the other hand, when examining the
frequency of victimization (Table 4.3), the model was found to be significant at the 5% typeI error rate (p = 0.0480). Findings tell us that in this particular model, there is a moderating
variable and we will discuss this interaction term shortly. The unstandardized coefficients,
B, indicates the change in the dependent variable per unit change of one independent variable
holding all other independent variables in the model at constant value. The regression model
for frequency of victimization experience indicates that (n = 95) respondents who stated they
have experienced online victimization on Facebook®, males were 12.21 units higher to
experience victimization experience than females (B=12.21; p =< .05). In addition, even
though mutuality is significant (p =< .05), I take for granted and will focus instead on the
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interaction term of Intensity X Mutuality (p =< .05) being that the interaction term—when
significant—takes precedence over its component main effects (i.e., Intensity, and Mutuality)
(see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2).
In multiple linear regression analysis, the standardized coefficients are used to
determine which independent variables are the most statistically important in determining the
dependent variable (Nathan et al., 2012). A closer look at the results in Table 4.3, data
indicates that gender (β= +0.268; p < .05) is a weaker predictor in determining whether an
individual will experience online victimization compared to the main effect of mutuality (β=
+0.299; p < .05) and the interaction term of intensity X mutuality (β= -0.299; p < .05).
Table 4.3. Multiple Linear Regression- Frequency
independent variables
Age

Beta
-.168

B

S.E.

p-value

37.071

17.654

.039

-1.115

.797

.166

Senior (1=senior, 0=not senior)

.018

.591

4.042

.884

Male (1=male, 0=female)

.268

12.214

5.334

.025*

Intensity of FB utilization (# of hours per week)

-.168

-1.532

.959

.114

Extensity of FB utilization (# in years)

.240

-.132

-1.065

.900

Degree of User Control (1- Public, 0-Private)

.056

2.273

4.273

.596

Mutuality (PCA derived)1
Recognition (Mean derived)²

.299

5.000

2.216

.027*

-.012

-.447

4.683

.924

Intensity X Degree of User Control

-.086

-1.914

2.411

.430

Intensity X Mutuality

-.299

-2.807

1.143

.016*

Intensity X Recognition

.017

.394

2.809

.889

Extensity X Degree of User Control

.035

.742

2.290

.747

-.075

-.550

.880

.534

Extensity X Recognition

.072

1.409

2.357

.552

R²

.256

Adjusted R²

.117

Extensity X Mutuality

p-value of model
df

.0480
89

N=95
1

dervied by PCA of number (1= 0, 2= 3, 3= 8, 4= 11+; Midpoints) and importance (1,2,3).

²derived by simple average; 1=Not Imp, 2=Imp, 3=Very Imp
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Figure 4.2 is a depiction of results found in Table 4.3 regarding the interaction term
of intensity and mutuality. It shows that the lower an individual is in terms of mutuality, then
the relationship between Facebook® utilization of intensity and the frequency of
victimization experience gets ever stronger. By imagining the lines going counter clockwise,
one can see that as the line moves from red to blue, meaning from high mutuality to low
mutuality, then individuals who are low in mutuality (i.e. do not find it important to have
mutual friends or do not have mutual friends before accepting a friend request) are more
likely to experience a longer period of victimization. For those who are high in mutuality,
that results show a weakening strength between Facebook® intensity of use and the frequency
of victimization experience. This means that individuals who have a high number of friends,
and believe that having mutual friends before accepting a friend request is important, will
experience victimization for a shorter period of time. In other words, let’s imagine a
Facebook® user who does not take into consideration the number of friends he/she has with
other friends on Facebook®. He/she receives a friend request, and accepts it. As a result of
not finding it important to have mutual friends or finding the need of have a number of
mutual friends before accepting a friend request, then the likelihood of a Facebook® user
experiencing online victimization is longer whether it be in hours, days, weeks, months, or
years.
Issues with Intensity and Severity Dimensions of Analysis
Directing focus to the intensity and severity dimensions, severity had to be eliminated
due to the large amount of missing values. Since there was too many missing values, the
analysis could not be completed without violating assumptions of the statistical test, thus
rendering the results invalid as the threat to statistical conclusion validity is too high. The
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dimension of intensity also could not be analyzed given none of the models were significant;
therefore, it was not included in the regression analysis section.
Figure 4.2 will portray how the original conceptual framework resulted into the final
theoretical model. The changes are due to empirical data findings.

Figure 4.1 Graph depicting the interaction between Intensity and Mutuality in relation
to Frequency of Victimization
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Figure 4.2 Recalibrated Theoretical Model

Personal Characteristics

Prevention Measures

Facebook Utilization

Victim Experience
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Chapter 5
Discussion
One of the main questions of this thesis was: “does Facebook® utilization impact
online victimization experience, and is such impact moderated by the type of prevention
measure(s) used?” With respect to the first part of this question, results suggest that the
answer is yes. Results indicate that the amount of time a user spends online, increases the
user’s chances of experiencing online victimization. With respect to the second part of this
question, the results suggest a more complicated picture. When “ever victimized” is
considered, results suggest that there are no interaction/moderating terms that were
significant. None of the prevention measures utilized had an influence on the relationship
between Facebook® utilization and victimization experience. Furthermore, the findings show
that Facebook® utilization directly affects victimization experience. In addition, prevention
measures were also directly affecting victimization experience. This finding negated my
core hypothesis, which posited that prevention measures would moderate the relationship
between Facebook® utilization and victimization experience. Taking into account the
measurement of extensity for the Facebook® utilization dimension, results suggest this not to
be significant or important. Thus, the amount of time (e.g. years spent using Facebook®) is
not important in predicting future victimization experience. While literature is silent on why
this variable does not influence future victimization, one can surmise that this may be due to
a fluctuation in use of Facebook® from one year to the next.
In regards to the frequency of victimization, the current data suggest that the most
noteworthy finding was the interaction term of Intensity and Mutuality. Therefore, the
prevention measure of mutuality moderated the relationship between Facebook® intensity of
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utilization and the frequency of online victimization experience. Analysis indicated that as
the importance of mutuality decreased, the positive relationship between intensity of
Facebook® utilization and frequency of victimization became even stronger.
It can be concluded that individuals who spent more time online (Facebook®) are
more likely to experience online victimization. The relationship between time spent online
and victimization is consistent with the findings of of Marcum (2008) who found respondents
who spent more time online increased their exposure to a motivated offender—then the
greater the likelihood of experiencing online victimization. Thus, even though the internet
and social media sites have had positive impacts on our daily lives, they have also increased
the opportunities for crime to occur (Marcum, 2008). In considering gender, females were
more likely than males to experience online victimization. The findings from the current
research that females do in fact experience online victimization more than males is consistent
with the extant literature (Marcum et al., 2012; Reyns et al., 2011).
In reflecting on degree of user control, previous research has not directly addressed
the question of a relationship between privacy settings on social media and online
victimization. The current research found that the odds of experiencing online victimization
for individuals who have their privacy settings set to public are almost 3 times higher than
those who have their privacy settings set to private, the study advances knowledge on this
topic. Loong (2014) also found that in regards to Facebook® users, individuals who had their
privacy settings set to public, were significantly related to cyber stalking. Additionally,
Mathiyalakan, Heilman, and White (2012) and Williams et al., (2011) stated that individuals
who had their privacy settings set to public were more vulnerable online as a result of
disclosing information that could be harmful to the user.
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Mutuality and recognition have never been applied to cybercrime victimization on
Facebook®. Cruz-Cunha and Portela, (2015) examined the relationship between a person’s
privacy settings and the likelihood of accepting a friend request, but not the roles by which
mutuality and recognition may play in determining the likelihood of experiencing online
victimization. Cruz-Cunha and Portela, (2015) also found that individuals who did not have
mutual friends, then the greater the chance they were to take risks online. The goal of CruzCunha and Portela (2015) was to determine if users who take more risks were likely to share
or reveal more information about themselves on Facebook®. The aim of the current research
was to apply mutuality and recognition as a means to investigate whether these two
dimensions have a relationship to that of victimization experience. The thought process
behind deciding to create and use these two dimensions will be mentioned. For the
measurements of mutuality and recognition, through personal experience of speaking with
friends concerning who they tend to accept on Facebook® and why; I realized that it is of
absolute importance to shed light upon what types of practices may lead to an increase in
victimization experience. The prominence of defining whether or not mutuality and
recognition play an important part in the likelihood of online victimization on Facebook®
was due to determining what is considered before accepting or declining a friend request.
Although there is no literature distinguishing why one accepts friend requests while others do
not, research has focused on determining the risks users take online (Cruz-Cunha & Portela,
2015). Extant literature that focuses on what risks users take that lead to the type of
information shared online brings forth wanting to know why one user may accept friend
requests while others do not. As a result, that is why it was decided to incorporate the two
new dimensions of—mutuality and recognition.
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When applying these findings to LRAT, which contains three major elements: a
motivated offender, a suitable target, and the lack of a capable guardian (Cohen & Felson,
1979), there are motivated offenders lurking social media—in this case, Facebook®; findings
show that ninety-five respondents of the entire sample (n=209) experienced online
victimization. When we take into account the potential target component, the findings
supported literature because individuals who spent a large amount of time online, were more
likely to experience online victimization (Reyns et al., 2011). The oversharing of personally
identifiable information tends to also increased the likelihood of victimization experience
since attractiveness increases when an individual posts personal information such as their:
relationship status, e-mail addresses, sexual orientation, activities, photos, height, and weight
(Reyns et al., 2011). The previous literature measures capable guardianship by
acknowledging whether or not an individual has a firewall or a security program installed in
their computer (Reyns et al., 2011). However, for the purposes of this study, the degree of
use control dimension was used to measure the lack of a capable guardian element. The
reason for this departure from the literature is because it is always the individual’s decision to
decide whether or not they want to install a firewall or a security program in their computer.
So, applying the degree of user control dimension which also focuses on an individual
deciding to set his/her privacy settings to public or private, it could be used to represent a
lack of a capable guardian.
Finally, the results from the current study indicate that LRAT can be applied as an
explanation of cybercrime victimization. Consistent with the extant research, this study
shows that incorporating the three main elements of LRAT (a motivated offender, a suitable
target, and the lack of a capable guardian) we can apply the theory to the explanation of
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cybercrime victimization experience (see Holt & Bossler, 2009; Reyns, Henson, & Fisher,
2011; Yar, 2005; Taylor et al., 2006; Choi, 2008; Bossler & Holt, 2009; Ngo & Patermaster,
2011). Furthermore, the current findings offer support to a growing body of literature which
suggests that when a motivated offender and a potential target intersect within a network,
victimization is likely to take place (Reyns, 2013).
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Recap
In conclusion, cybercrime on social media sites is becoming more common (Illmer,
2016; George, 2014). As we enjoy the benefits of the advancements in technology, we must
recognize that the opportunities of crime to occur increases online (Marcum, Higgins,
Freiburger, & Ricketts, 2014). The research findings of the current research indicates that the
core hypothesis (i.e. does Facebook® utilization impact online victimization experience and
is such experience moderated by the type of prevention measure used) was found to be
supported. But, when we consider the second part of the question: is victimization experience
conditioned or moderated by the type of prevention measure used depends on the two
different dimensions of ever victimized and frequency.
Considering the second hypothesis—it was indicated that individuals who review
their privacy settings are less likely to become victims of cybercrime was found to be true for
this population of Facebook® users. The dimension of prevention measures that has to do
with degree of user control was found to be significant—stating that individuals who have
their privacy settings set to public are more likely to experience online victimization than
individuals who have their privacy settings set to private.
The third hypothesis stated that users’ who constantly spend time on Facebook® are
more likely to have experienced online victimization compared to individuals who spend less
time on the Facebook®—this assumption too, was found to be supported. Considering the
fourth statement that Facebook® users who do not take the number of mutual friends
(mutuality) into consideration, are more likely to experience online victimization than users
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who do not accept friend requests if they have a low number of mutual friends—this was
found to be supported. Empirical data showed individuals who were low in mutuality did
experience online victimization than individuals who had a high number of friends.
Lastly, the hypothesis that those who do not recognize a user’s profile picture or a
user’s profile name and accept a friend request are more likely to experience victimization
than users who take those elements into consideration—was found to be false or not
supported. In addition, the recognition dimension was not found to be significant.
Unfortunately, as stated previously, no literature determines why this may be the case,
however, it may be linked to the fluctuations of use per year.
Moreover, the study along with other research found that LRAT can be applied in the
attempt of explaining online victimization experience. The number of time one spends
online, whether an individual has his/her privacy settings set to public, and being female all
influence the likelihood of victimization experience. Taking into account a motivated
offender, a suitable target based on attractiveness (oversharing of information and spending
time online), and the lack of a capable guardian are important elements that determine the
likelihood of victimization experience on Facebook®.
Policy Implications
As stated by literature, individuals who spend a great amount of time online tend to
be the ones who experience online victimization (Bossler et al., 2012). Creating a solution to
reduce the likelihood of individuals experiencing online victimization on social media outlets
leads us to acknowledge campaigns and programs in place to reduce the likelihood of online
victimization. As technology advances, so do the platforms of social media sites. Users
should re-think how they engage with others in an online environment and how they are
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keeping themselves safe from becoming victims of cybercrime. This study recommends users
to become familiar with safe practices to reduce the likelihood of becoming victims. For
instance, the Department of Homeland Security has a campaign blog titled
Stop.Think.Connect. This blog assists online users to help them and their families stay safe
while enjoying the benefits of technology (The Department of Homeland Security, 2016). In
addition, there is a campaign named, Take a Bite out of Cyber Crime, which helps empower
online users to protect themselves from online predators (CMO Council, 2016). These
campaigns are implemented in the hope of increasing public awareness that cybercrime does
exist and they should do everything in their power to battle against this growing criminal
activity (CMO Council, 2016).
The focus of this research was online victimization experience on Facebook®.
Therefore, a main recommendation from the findings of the current study is that, Facebook®
users should become aware of a Facebook® prevention campaign that targets teenagers and
their parents, but that could be beneficial to all. The resource is titled, the Bullying
Prevention Hub which was developed by Facebook® in partnership with the Yale Center for
Emotional Intelligence (Facebook®, 2016). This particular resource focuses mainly on
cyberbullying and what teenagers, parents, and educators can do to prevent further
victimization experience (Facebook®, 2016).
Incorporating various resources, becoming aware of different programs and
campaigns with the goal of making users safe, this study recommends and encourages all
users to become familiar with how one may continue to enjoy their time online while doing
everything in their efforts to decrease the likelihood of experiencing online victimization.
There are more programs, campaigns, and resources that online users can use and implement
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in their daily lives. The social policy recommendations listed above are to assist users in the
attempt of making them aware that there are ways to stay safe online, to avoid becoming
victims of cybercrime.
Limitations
This study is not without limitations. The first limitation was the amount of missing
values present within the data set for the dependent variable dimension of severity. The
measurement could have been eliminated but after debating the pros and cons, I decided that
it would be best to completely eliminate the variable. Briggs, Clark, Wolstenholme, and
Clarke (2003) states that in cases of having a large amount of missing data for variables, then
excluding them from the analysis is a beneficial option. Since, the dimension of severity
would stand alone in the process of incorporating the multiple linear regression analysis
approach, excluding this variable from the study did not affect further analysis for the study.
The second major detriment was that the external validity of this study is
automatically threatened as a consequence of utilizing a non-probability convenience
sampling technique. A convenience sampling technique is a method in which respondents are
selected or voluntarily agree to partake in a research study due to their easy accessibility or
proximity to the researcher (Etikan, Musa, & Alkassim, 2015). The fact that respondents who
participated in this survey study were only either criminal justice or psychology students who
volunteered to partake in this study—we cannot compare the results to that of other
university findings. Results cannot be compared as a result of not having conducted a
randomized, probability sampling technique that would include all students regardless of
their field of study. Consequently, there are concerns with using a convenience sampling
technique given that this type of sampling method is not to be representative of a populace,
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and therefore, one is not to draw generalizations within a population or inferences about a
population from a convenience sample (Etikan et al., 2015).
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Appendix A: Survey
1. In what year were you born? (enter 4-digit birth year; for example, 1976)

2. What is your gender?
o Female
o Male
3. What is your sexual orientation?
o Heterosexual
o Homosexual (i.g. Gay; Lesbian)
o Bisexual
o Questioning
4. What is your ethnicity?
o Hispanic
o Non-Hispanic
5. What is your classification?
o Freshman
o Sophomore
o Junior
o Senior
6. Do you currently have a Facebook account?
o Yes
o No
7. Are you active on Facebook? (E.g. comment, post, share, like picture/videos/etc.)
o Yes
o No
8. How many friends do you have on Facebook?

9. For how many years have you been using Facebook?
10. One average, how many hours/minutes a day do you spend on Facebook?
o 0 to <1 hour
o 1 hour to <2 hours
o 2 hours to <3 hours
o 3 hours to <4 hours
o 4 hours+
11. In a typical week, about how many hours/minutes do you actively engage (E.g.
personal messaging, chatting, liking, and replying) on Facebook?
o 0 to <1 hour
o 1 hour to <2 hours
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o 2 hours to <3 hours
o 3 hours to <4 hours
o 4 hours to <5 hours
o 5 hours+
12. The following questions will determine how often you use Facebook.
Always Most of the time Sometimes Once in a while
Never

How often do you log onto Facebook at work?
How often do you log onto Facebook at school?
How often do you log onto Facebook at home?

13. At what time of the day do you log onto Facebook?
o 6:00 a.m. to 8:59 a.m.
o 9:00 a.m. to 11:59 a.m.
o 12:00 p.m. to 2:59 p.m.
o 3:00 p.m. to 5:59 p.m.
o 6:00 p.m. to 8:59 p.m.
o 9:00 p.m. to 11:59 p.m.
o 12 a.m. to 2:59 a.m.
o 3:00 a.m. to 5:59 a.m.
14. These items will determine which days of the week you are most likely and less likely
to be on Facebook.
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Sunday

Which day of the week are you
most likely to be on Facebook?
Which day of the week are you
second most likely to be on Facebook?
Which day of the week are you
least likely to be on Facebook?
Which day of the week are you
second least likely to be on Facebook?

15. In accepting a Facebook request, how important is having mutual friends?
o Not Important
o Important
o Very Important
16. How many mutual friends do you have to have in order to accept a friend request?
o 0
o 1-5
o 6-10
o 11+
17. How important are the following in accepting a Facebook friend request?
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Not Important

Important

Very Important

In accepting a Facebook request,
how important is having to recognize
a user’s profile name?
In accepting a Facebook request,
how important is having to recognize
a user’s profile photo?

18. Whose friend request(s) do you tend to accept? (Please select all that apply).
o Close Friends
o Acquaintances
o Family members
o People you only met once
o Classmates
o Co-workers
o Everyone (strangers)
19. Who can view your:
Only friends (Private)

Everyone (Public)

Posts
Videos
Photos
Status Updates
Personal Information
(D.O.B., address, phone
number, etc.)

20. Have you ever changed certain privacy/security setting on Facebook? Check all that
apply in regards to changing such settings.
o Browse Facebook on a secure connection
o Set people who can look you up to only “friends”
o Enabled Login Notifications (to be alerted when you or someone else has
logged on to your Facebook account from another device/laptop/etc., through
text or e-mail)
o Have used one time passwords- Login Approvals (used when you have logged
in from another device; a code will be sent to you via text)
o Changed who can see your timeline (e.g. only me; only friends)
o Have used remote sign out (Signed-out from another device you logged into in
order to log out from another location)
o Set up a list of trusted contacts (e.g. you have approved certain friends to help
you access your account when need be)
o You have changed your inbox filer from basic to strict filtering
o You have changed who can tag you on posts (e.g. only friends)
o You have blocked a certain user(s)
o You have added friends to your “restricted list”
21. Have you ever had your personal information stolen on Facebook? (Hacked)
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o Yes
o No
22. How long ago did this take place?
o 0 to 1 year
o 1 to 2 years
o 2 to 3 years
o 3 to 4 years
o 5+ years
23. How long did it last?
o < than 2 weeks
o < than 1 month
o < than 3 months
o < than 6 months
o < than 10 months
o < than 1 year
o 1 to <2 years
o 2 to <3 years
o 3+ years
24. How many times did you experience this type of cyber-crime? (Hacking)
o 1 to 2
o 3 to 4
o 5 to 6
o 7+
25. Which of the following describes the severity of your victimization experience? (1
being not at all severe and 10 being extremely severe).
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

You had to consult
with a medical doctor.
You had to report the incident
to Facebook to deactivate the account.
You had to report the
incident to law enforcement.
You had to consult with
a psychologist.

26. Has anyone ever used your pictures, videos, personal information, or etc. without
your permission? (Cyber Impersonation)
o Yes
o No
27. How long ago did this take place?
o 0 to 1 year
o 1 to 2 years
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o 2 to 3 years
o 3 to 4 years
o 5+ years
28. How long did it last?
o < than 2 weeks
o < than 1 month
o < than 3 months
o < than 6 months
o < than 10 months
o < than 1 year
o 1 to <2 years
o 2 to <3 years
o 3+ years
29. How many times did you experience this type of cyber-crime? (Cyber Impersonation)
o 1 to 2
o 3 to 4
o 5 to 6
o 7+
30. Which of the following describes the severity of your victimization experience? (1
being not at all severe and 10 being extremely severe).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
You had to consult
with a medical doctor.
You had to report the incident
to Facebook to deactivate the account.
You had to report the
incident to law enforcement.

You had to consult with
a psychologist.

31. Has anyone ever threatened you by sending you fearful messages, pictures, videos, or
spreading rumors or untruthful facts about you on Facebook? (Cyberbullying/Harassment)
o Yes
o No
32. How long ago did this take place?
o 0 to 1 year
o 1 to 2 years
o 2 to 3 years
o 3 to 4 years
o 5+ years
33. How long did it last?
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o < than 2 weeks
o < than 1 month
o < than 3 months
o < than 6 months
o < than 10 months
o < than 1 year
o 1 to <2 years
o 2 to <3 years
o 3+ years
34. How many times did you experience this type of cyber-crime? (Cyberbullying/Harassment)
o 1 to 2
o 3 to 4
o 5 to 6
o 7+
35. Which of the following describes the severity of your victimization experience? (1
being not at all severe and 10 being extremely severe).
1 2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
You had to consult
with a medical doctor.
You had to report the incident
to Facebook to deactivate the account.
You had to report the
incident to law enforcement.
You had to consult with
a psychologist.

36. Has anyone deceived you into believing they were someone they were not, in order to
get closer to you and to gain emotional feelings for him/her? (Online Romance Scam)
o Yes
o No
37. How long ago did this take place?
o 0 to 1 year
o 1 to 2 years
o 2 to 3 years
o 3 to 4 years
o 5+ years
38. How long did it last?
o < than 2 weeks
o < than 1 month
o < than 3 months
o < than 6 months

86
o < than 10 months
o < than 1 year
o 1 to <2 years
o 2 to <3 years
o 3+ years
39. How many times did you experience this type of cyber-crime? (Online Romance
Scam)
o 1 to 2
o 3 to 4
o 5 to 6
o 7+
40. Which of the following describes the severity of your victimization experience? (1
being not at all severe and 10 being extremely severe).
1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
You had to consult
with a medical doctor.
You had to report the incident
to Facebook to deactivate the account.
You had to report the
incident to law enforcement.
You had to consult with
a psychologist.

41. Has someone ever tried to steal your identity by making a fake profile on Facebook
with accurate personal information? (Identity Theft)
o Yes
o No
42. How long ago did this take place?
o 0 to 1 year
o 1 to 2 years
o 2 to 3 years
o 3 to 4 years
o 5+ years
43. How long did it last?
o < than 2 weeks
o < than 1 month
o < than 3 months
o < than 6 months
o < than 10 months
o < than 1 year
o 1 to <2 years
o 2 to <3 years
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o 3+ years
44. How many times did you experience this type of cyber-crime? (Identity Theft)
o 1 to 2
o 3 to 4
o 5 to 6
o 7+
45. Which of the following describes the severity of your victimization experience? (1
being not at all severe and 10 being extremely severe).
1 2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
You had to consult
with a medical doctor.
You had to report the incident
to Facebook to deactivate the account.
You had to report the
incident to law enforcement.
You had to consult with
a psychologist.

46. Have you experienced fraud as a result of opening a link on Facebook, and
purchasing something online? (Online Fraud)
o Yes
o No
47. How long ago did this take place?
o 0 to 1 year
o 1 to 2 years
o 2 to 3 years
o 3 to 4 years
o 5+ years
48. How long did it last?
o < than 2 weeks
o < than 1 month
o < than 3 months
o < than 6 months
o < than 10 months
o < than 1 year
o 1 to <2 years
o 2 to <3 years
o 3+ years
49. How many times did you experience this type of cyber-crime? (Online Fraud)
o 1 to 2
o 3 to 4
o 5 to 6
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o 7+
50. Which of the following describes the severity of your victimization experience? (1
being not at all severe and 10 being extremely severe).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
You had to consult
with a medical doctor.
You had to report the incident
to Facebook to deactivate the account.
You had to report the
incident to law enforcement.
You had to consult with
a psychologist.

51. How many times in the past 12 months have you experienced victimization on
Facebook?
o 1
o 2
o 3
o 4
o 5+
52. Did you change any online behavior on Facebook as a result of your victimization
experience? If so, please select all that apply.
o Stopped using Facebook
o Deactivated Facebook account
o Changed privacy/security settings to private
o Made a new Facebook account
o Kept same Facebook account but changed password
o None.
53. The following questions focus on the aftermath of your victimization experience.
Did you suffer from depression?
Did you feel lonely?
Did you suffer from anxiety?
Did you experience Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)?
Did you experience headaches, nightmares, and/or insomnia?
Did you have difficulty having relationships with others in an online setting?
Do you fear being victimized again?
Did you seek medical attention?
Did you seek counseling?

Yes

No
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54. The following questions will determine how confident you are that Facebook was the
source of your victimization experience.
Not at all confident
How confident are you that
Facebook was the source of
your victimization experience?
If you are not confident, how
confident are you that Facebook
was a contributing factor to your
victimization experience?

Somewhat confident

Very confident
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Appendix B: Frequency Tables
Table 1. Respondent's age group distribution
Age group

Count

%

Cumulative %

19-22 (1)

87

43.3

43.3

23-26 (2)

70

34.8

78.1

> 27 (3)

44

21.9

100.0

Total

201

100.0

Table 2. Respondent's gender group distribution
Gender

Count

%

Cumulative %

Female-0

153

74.3

74.3

Male-1

53

25.7

100.0

Total

206

100.0

Table 3. Respondent's classification group distribution
Classification

Count

%

Cumulative %

Not Senior-0

110

53.1

53.1

Senior-1

97

46.9

100.0

Total

207

100.0
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Table 4. Respondent's intensity (time spent online) group distribution

Intensity

Count

%

Cumulative %

0 to <1 hr

70

34.5

34.5

1 hr to 2 hr

32

15.8

50.2

2 hr to 3 hr

16

7.9

58.1

3 hr to 4 hr

22

10.8

69.0

4 hr to 5 hr

18

8.9

77.8

>5hr

45

22.2

100.0

Total

203

100.0

Table 5. Respondent's extensity (# of years) group distribution
Extensity

Count

%

Cumulative %

0

13

6.4

6.4

1

4

2.0

8.4

2

4

2.0

10.4

3

9

4.5

14.9

4

16

7.9

22.8

5

37

18.3

41.1

6

46

22.8

63.9

7

34

16.8

80.7

8

19

9.4

90.1

92
9

8

4.0

94.1

>10

12

5.9

100.0

Total

202

100.0

Table 6. Respondent's importance of having mutual friends group distribution

Importance Mutual Friend Count

%

Cumulative %

Not Important-1

18

9.8

9.8

Important-2

45

24.6

34.4

Very Important-3

120

65.6

100.0

Total

183

100.0

Table 7. Respondent's number of friends one must have to accept a friend request
group distribution
Number of Friends

Count

%

Cumulative %

0 (1)

9

4.9

4.9

1-5 (2)

77

42.3

47.3

6-10 (3)

35

19.2

66.5

>11 (4)

61

33.5

100.0

Total

182

100.0

93
Table 8. Respondent's recognition of profile name group distribution
Recognition of Profile
%
Name

Count

Cumulative %

Not Important-1

10

7.7

7.7

Important-2

60

46.2

53.8

Very Important-3

60

46.2

100.0

Total

130

100.0

Table 9. Respondent's recognition of user photo group distribution
Recognition of User Photo Count

%

Cumulative %

Not Important-1

6

3.5

3.5

Important-2

69

40.1

43.6

Very Important-3

97

56.4

100.0

Total

172

100.0

Table 10.1 Respondent's posts group distribution
Posts

Count

%

Cumulative %

Private-0

103

85.8

85.8

Public-1

17

14.2

100.0

Total

120

100.0
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Table 10.2 Respondent's personal information group distribution
Personal Information

Count

%

Cumulative %

Private-0

39

32.2

32.2

Public-1

82

67.8

100.0

Total

121

100.0

Table 11.1 Hacked
N=209

Count

%

Cumulative %

No-0

160

87.4

87.4

Yes-1

23

12.6

100.0

Total

183

100.0

Table 11.2 Cyber-Impersonation
N=209

Count

%

Cumulative %

No-0

163

88.6

88.6

Yes-1

21

11.4

100.0

Total

184

100.0
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Table 11.3 Cyber-Bullying
N=209

Count

%

Cumulative %

No-0

135

73.4

73.4

Yes-1

49

26.6

100.0

Total

184

100.0

Table 11.4 Online Romance Scams
N=209

Count

%

Cumulative %

No-0

150

82.0

82.0

Yes-1

33

18.0

100.0

Total

183

100.0

Table 11.5 Identity Theft
N=209

Count

%

Cumulative %

No-0

173

94.0

94.0

Yes-1

11

6.0

100.0

Total

184

100.0
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Table 11.6 Online Fraud
N=209

Count

%

Cumulative %

No-0

165

90.2

90.2

Yes-1

18

9.8

100.0

Total

183

100.0

Table 12 Ever Victimized
N=209

Count

%

Cumulative %

No-0

89

48.4

48.4

Yes-1

95

51.6

100.0

Total

97
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